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Abstract 
Primary school enrolment rates are very low in francophone Africa. In order to enhance education supply, 
many countries have launched large teacher recruitment programmes in recent years, whereby teachers 
are no longer engaged on civil servant positions, but on the basis of (fixed-term) contracts typically 
implying considerably lower salaries and a sharply reduced duration of professional training. While this 
policy has led to a boost of primary enrolment, there is a concern about a loss in the quality of education. 
In this paper we analyse the impact on educational quality, by estimating nonparametrically the quantile 
treatment effects for Niger, Togo and Mali, based on very informative data, comparable across these 
countries. We find that contract teachers do relatively better for low ability children in low grades than for 
high ability children in higher grades. When positive treatment effects were found, they tended to be more 
positive at the low to medium quantiles; when negative effects were found they tended to be more 
pronounced at the high ability quantiles. Hence, overall it seems that contract teachers do a relatively 
better job for teaching students with learning difficulties than for teaching the ‘more advanced’ children. 
This implies that contract teachers tend to reduce inequalities in student outcomes. 
At the same time, we also observe clear differences between the countries. We find that, overall, effects 
are positive in Mali, somewhat mixed in Togo (with positive effects in 2nd and negative effects in 5th 
grade) and negative in Niger. This ordering is consistent with theoretical expectations derived from a 
closer examination of the different ways of implementation of the contract teacher programme in the three 
countries. In Mali and, to some extent, in Togo, the contract teacher system works more through the local 
communities. This may have led to closer monitoring and more effective hiring of contract teachers. In 
Niger, the system was changed in a centralized way with all contract teachers being public employees, so 
that there is no reason to expect much impact on local monitoring. In addition, the extremely fast hiring of 
huge numbers of contract teachers may also have contributed to relatively poor performance in Niger. 
These results are expected to be relevant for other sub-Saharan African countries, too, as well as for the 
design of new contract teacher programmes in the future. 
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1. Introduction  
With a rapidly increasing youth population and swift increases in the proportion of children 
attending school, many developing countries are facing serious difficulties in recruiting and 
financing qualified teachers. Therefore many African countries have been experimenting with 
alternative teacher training and recruitment programmes employing so-called “contract 
teachers” instead of traditional civil servants. These new teachers are usually hired on fixed-
term contracts with shorter training and lower remuneration. Similarly, contract teachers have 
also been employed in Latin America and South Asia (for an overview, see Duthilleul 2005). 
Despite the widespread introduction of contract teacher programmes in many countries from the 
mid-1990s onwards, there does not seem to exist a detailed microeconometric evaluation of the 
effects of this policy change. 
In this paper, we analyse the effect of the reform process on student achievement in the three 
francophone sub-Saharan African countries Mali, Niger and Togo. While these countries show 
many social, economic and cultural similarities and introduced the contract teacher programmes 
to cope with similar problems, the way these programmes were implemented and the 
characteristics of the actual contracts used vary considerably. 
The differences in the results of earlier studies for individual African countries (PASEC 2003, 
2004, 2005a, 2005b, Vegas and de Laat 2003, Bourdon, Frölich and Michaelowa 2006) suggest 
that these specific characteristics may determine the success or failure of these programmes. This 
calls for a direct country-comparison using comparable data and a uniform estimation approach. 
It is the objective of this paper to provide this comparison. In addition, this paper attempts to 
improve upon the estimation techniques used in earlier studies by estimating quantile treatment 
effects. Apart from the general advantage of nonparametric estimations to avoid functional form 
assumptions, this has the additional benefit of providing us with detailed information on the 
effect of contract teachers on different segments of the student population. 
This paper is related to two distinct strands of the literature. The first concerns questions of 
teacher incentives and working conditions. While studies on the effects of physical inputs have 
not yet reached fully conclusive results (see e.g. Hanushek 2003 versus Krueger 2003), there is 
growing recognition that these effects are, at best, rather limited. Therefore, for industrialised 
and developing countries alike, scholars have turned increasingly to the analysis of incentives 
and institutional conditions of teaching and learning. The discussion covers performance pay 
(see e.g. Lavy 2002, 2004 for Israel; Kingdon and Teal 2007, and Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman 2006 for India; Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer 2003 for Kenya; Spretsma and 
Waldenberg 2007 for Brazil), standardised exams (Bishop and Wößmann 2004), private 
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education and school choice (King, Orazem and Wohlgemuth 1999, Angrist et al. 2002 and 
Angrist, Bettinger and Kremer 2004 for Colombia; and Hoxby 2000, 2003a, 2003b mainly for 
the United States) , teacher monitoring (Banerjee and Duflo 2006, Duflo and Hanna 2005, and 
Kremer et al. 2005 for India), and monitoring by local communities (Reinikka and Svensson 
2004 for Uganda, Francken Minten and Swinnen 2005 for Madagascar). In addition, the impact of 
teacher quality and its relation to academic and professional qualifications has received increased 
attention (Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain 2005; Hanushek et al. 2005; Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor 
2006; Aaronson, Barrow and Sander 2003; Angrist and Guryan 2004; Rockoff 2004, for the 
United States), just as specific teaching innovations (see e.g. Machin and McNally 2004 for the 
“Literature hour” in the United Kingdom). For a review of some of this literature with a focus on 
developing countries, see Glewwe and Kremer (2006) or Wößmann (2005). 
The second strand of the literature is specific to developing countries in their efforts to reach the 
objective of providing at least basic education to all. This objective has been codified not only in 
the Education for All (EFA) objectives in 1990 and in 2000, but also in the Millennium 
Development Goals. The countries facing the greatest problems in meeting the challenge are 
primarily located in sub-Saharan Africa. According to recent estimates, granting access to school 
for all primary-aged children in this region will require an expansion of the teaching force by 
68% over the next decade (UNESCO-UIS 2006). This challenge is even greater in the 
francophone countries of the Sahel region (Mingat and Suchaut 2000). According to Bruns et al. 
(2002, Tables 1.1 and 2.4) so far, only 45% of African children complete primary school, and all 
francophone sub-Saharan African countries except Gabon and Togo show figures that lie below 
or around this regional average. Out of seven countries with primary completion rates at 25% or 
below, six are francophone. With primary completion rates below 20% and an overall net 
primary enrolment rate of only 31%, Niger held the sad record of the worst performer worldwide 
at the end of the 1990s (UNESCO-UIS 2005, PASEC 2005a). With primary completion rates of 
below 15%, Mali was in an even worse position until the mid 1990s, but has improved 
considerably thereafter (World Bank 2006a). 
Collecting evidence for the specific characteristics of the education systems in those countries 
which reached the EFA objectives, MINEDAF (2002) suggests that primary teacher salaries 
should not be greater than 3.5 times GDP per capita. Towards the end of the 1990s, in many 
francophone African countries, including Mali, Niger and Togo, teacher salaries were clearly 
beyond this benchmark. In the Sahel countries Mali and Niger, primary teacher salaries even 
amounted to more than 6 times GDP per capita (MINEDAF 2002, p. 117). The most extreme 
case was Niger, with a ratio as high as about 10 times GDP per capita (UNESCO-UIS 2006, 
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p. 87). This figure was more than ten times higher than the corresponding figure for India (World 
Bank 2006b in combination with Duthilleul 2005, p. 25) and about six times higher than in 
OECD countries (OECD 2002, Table D6.1).  
At such high salaries in relation to national income, it was obviously impossible to hire the 
necessary number of teachers to meet the rising demand for education exacerbated by high 
population growth. To a somewhat lesser extent, the same applies for Mali and Togo as well as 
for a large number of other predominantly francophone African countries. From the mid-1990s 
onwards, for most countries, engaging contract teachers at considerably lower salaries than 
traditional civil servants appeared to be the sole solution for staffing their schools (Ndoye 2001, 
Mingat 2004). Even earlier, parents had often resorted to private initiatives, opening their own 
schools with privately engaged teachers, on contracts at considerably lower rates than those 
foreseen in the public sector.  
However, stakeholders in the education system generally fear that an important loss in education 
quality may go hand in hand with this new employment strategy. These fears have to be taken 
seriously, especially as the seminal work by Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005) identifies teachers 
and teaching quality as the key determinant of education quality.  
This paper will analyse to what extent these fears are justified, and provide some evidence on 
which forms of contracts (or which types of programme implementation) exacerbate or mitigate 
potential problems. The paper is structured as follows: Based on information compiled by 
Bernard, Tiyab and Vianou (2004), as well as Duthilleul (2005), Section 2 first demonstrates the 
quantitative relevance of contract teacher programmes and their development over time for Mali, 
Niger and Togo, as well as for other countries of the region. This section also discusses the 
differences of contract conditions across countries. Section 3 provides an overview of the data 
available for the analysis of the contract teachers’ impact on student achievement in the three 
comparison countries. Section 4 explains the estimation approach and Section 5 presents the 
results. Section 6 provides some conclusions and recommendations for education policy. 
 
2. Teacher incentives, teacher contracts and working conditions 
In most countries, teachers are employed as civil servants, except for short-term replacements, 
probation periods, or until they have reached the required qualification level (Duthilleul 2005). 
In recent years, however, the focus on increased access to education, along with high population 
growth rates and tight budget constraints, led to the broad-based introduction of contract teacher 
schemes, whereby teachers were hired on contracts rather than on civil-servant positions, usually 
combined with lower salaries and also lower professional pre-service training requirements. This 
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permitted a large increase in the number of teachers (see e.g. Ndoye 2001). While most countries 
in South Asia and Latin America started rather early and gradually introduced these changes 
without ever striving for a complete renewal of their teaching staff (see e.g. Govinda and 
Josephine 2004 for India, and Castro 2004 for Nicaragua), public policy reform in Africa was 
typically introduced later, i.e. towards the mid- or even late 1990s, but rather fast. In the early 
years of the new century, the period our empirical analysis will refer to, contract teachers already 
made up a sizeable share of the total teaching population (for current shares of contract teachers, 
see Table 1). 
In Niger, no more civil servants were engaged in the teaching profession at primary level after 
the contract teacher programme had been put in place in 1998. In addition, as for many years 
funding had been insufficient to train and recruit teachers according to earlier rules and 
regulations, huge gaps had to be closed by the newly engaged contract teachers. After 1998, 
almost 2800 new teachers were recruited every year, as compared to an average of 520 per year 
between 1990 and 1998 (PASEC 2005a). Therefore in the year 2000, contract teachers already 
made up the majority of the primary teacher population (Bernard, Tiyab and Vianou 2004, p. 5). 
Thereafter this proportion has remained about constant (see left hand side of Table 1). In fact it 
seems that the long-term maintenance of teacher salaries far above market rates had effectively 
paved the way for a radical change in teacher employment policies once the traditional system 
finally collapsed. See Figure 1 for an overview of teacher salaries in sub-Saharan Africa at the 
end of 1990s, i.e. at the time when average teacher salaries (relative to GDP per capita) were at 
their peak. The unsustainable level of salaries thus triggered the contract teacher reform and led 
to salaries of the new contract teachers accounting for only one third of those in the civil service 
(see right hand side of Table 1). Nevertheless, budgetary problems in Niger have remained so 
serious that the regular payment of even the reduced salaries is not always guaranteed (see 
Table 2). 
In Mali and Togo, the change was somewhat more moderate than in Niger and also started 
earlier. In both countries, it was initially driven by local communities who resulted in engaging 
their own (private) contract teachers when the state failed to provide them with the required staff. 
In Mali, the government also recruited the first contract teachers as early as in 1991, but numbers 
became significant only towards the end of the decade. After 1998, public contract teachers and 
traditional civil servants were typically recruited in about equal proportions (PASEC 2005b). 
Overall, contract teachers made up about 30% of the teaching staff in primary schools in 2000 
(Bernard et al. 2004). As the recruitment of contract teachers by local communities accelerated 
even further thereafter, data for 2004 show that almost 65% of primary education teachers are 
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now working on contracts (see Table 1). It should also be noted that, while the policy shift 
towards the employment of contract teachers was certainly less abrupt than in Niger, the 
difference in salaries was even greater. A contract teacher in Niger still earns 3.5 times the 
national GDP per capita, i.e. about 35% of the average salary of traditional teachers. In Mali, the 
initial rates for contract teachers were only around 25% for public contract teachers and 15% for 
community teachers. In the year 2000, this corresponded to 1.5 times and 0.9 times GDP per 
capita respectively (Bernard, Tiyab and Vianou 2004). Only more recently, public teacher salaries, 
especially for contract teachers, were increased to reduce the gap. However, the pay for 
community teachers has remained unchanged (see Table 1). 
 
Figure 1: Average salary of primary teachers relative to GDP per capita, 2000 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (quoted from MINEDAF 2002, p. 31). 
 
In Togo, the public recognition and recruitment of contract teachers started in the mid 1990s, 
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started to finance some of the EDIL teachers from the central budget. In 1999, 16% of EDIL 
teachers were paid by the Togolese government (World Bank 2002, p. 27). In parallel, the 
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expect all new teachers to fulfil the official requirements of a one-year professional training 
course in order to enter the teaching profession as a civil servant. In fact, such pre-service 
training was offered only in three years (1985, 1996 and 1997) within the whole period since 
1983 (PASEC 2004). As shown in Table 1, in 2001, this led to an overall proportion of contract 
teachers of 65% about half of which were engaged by the state, and half by local communities. 
Their remuneration corresponded to about 50% and 20% of traditional teacher salaries 
respectively.  
 
Table 1: Distribution and remuneration of primary teachers according to their statute 
Breakdown by statutes (%) Wages relative to GDP per capita 
Contract teachers  Civil servants Contract teachers   Country 
Civil servants 
public1 private2 Total Full Assistants3 public1 private2 
 Benin (2005) 54,7 16,4 29,0 5,2 5,7 3,9 2,1 1,1 
 Burkina Faso (2002) 64,1 23,6 12,2 5,8 7,1 5,1 5,6 2,2 
 Cameroon (2002) 34,9 20,4 44,7 5,3 5,7 4,1 1,4 0,8 
 Chad (2003) 38,4 17,2 44,4 7,4 8,2 6,0 1,7 0,4 
 Congo, Rep. of (2005)4 55,0 14,0 31,0 2,8 2,9 2,62 1,3 na 
 Guinea (2003) 30,9 38,9 30,1 3,4 3,5 2,7 1,9 1,2  
 Ivory Coast (2001) 87,3 0,0 12,7 4,8 5,0 3,0  - -  
 Madagascar (2003) 46,1 0,0 53,9 4,4 - - - 1,0 
 Mali (2004) 35,7 34,7 29,6 7,5 - - 4,8 1,0 
 Niger (2003) 46,0 50,2 3,8 8,9 10,5 8,0 3,5 -  
 Senegal (2003) 43,6 41,5 15,0 5,7 6,2 4,9 2,6 na  
 Togo (2001) 35,0 30,5 34,6 6,4 7,8 5,4 3,3 1,3 
Average (12 countries) 47,6 24,0 28,4 5,6 6,2 4,5 2,8  
1Public: under contract with public authorities 
2Private: engaged by and/or under contract with parents or local communities. This does not always correspond to 
the local terminology. In Togo, for instance, community teachers tend to be classified as “public” while the term 
“private” refers exclusively to expensive and well equipped schools run by other external providers such as the 
church.  
3Assistants are public employees engaged as a support of full teachers. 
4In Congo, salaries are calculated relative to GDP in 2003 in order to avoid the artificial effect of the change in 
petroleum prices in 2005. 
Source : World Bank (Africa Region) and Pôle de Dakar (2007, p. 66), slightly updated by the authors.  
 
Table 1 displays the above described characteristics of Mali, Niger and Togo in their regional 
context. It shows that firstly, the engagement of contract teachers has indeed become a widely 
spread phenomenon in the whole region. And secondly, it shows that contract conditions in 
terms of both remuneration and responsible authorities (public or private) vary considerably 
across countries. Privately employed contract teachers earn much lower salaries than traditional 
teachers in all countries, and often much less even as compared to the new public contract 
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teachers. In addition, the privately engaged contract teachers do not only face the potential 
challenge of a fixed-term contract which may or may not be renewed, but must also be expected 
to be much more closely monitored by the parents in the responsible local community who 
actually (directly or indirectly) finance their post. 
Further cross-country differences in contract teacher programmes exist with respect to entry 
requirements in terms of educational attainment and professional training. Typically, 
professional training has been considerably reduced from several years in specialised teacher 
training institutes (“Ecoles Normales”) to a few months, or even weeks provided by diverse 
institutions, or to on-the-job training under the mentorship of senior teachers. This reduction in 
teacher training also reduced the cost incurred by the education system, in particular as teacher 
candidates often received scholarships during this training period, i.e. before being actually 
employed in schools.  
In some countries like Guinea, cuts in the duration of professional training have gone hand in 
hand with a redefinition of course content and an attempt to adjust the curricula to issues truly 
relevant to teaching practice. A mandatory training period of 15-18 months including 6-9 months 
of practical teaching experience under the supervision of a senior colleague was built into the 
new recruitment procedure (Faoura 2004, pp. 105ff.). In Mali, teacher candidates who have not 
attended other forms of pedagogical training, have to follow a three-month course preparing 
them for their work (PASEC 2005b). As opposed to the situation in Guinea and Mali, contract 
teachers in Niger initially only received a 45-day training and even the latter requirement was not 
always met in practice (PASEC 2005b). If some contract teachers have effectively attended 
longer training courses, they can be assumed to have been candidates for traditional teaching 
positions who have not been able to find a position on the labour market. Traditional civil 
servant teachers had to follow a training administered in the “Ecole Normale” for one or two 
years. Only recently, yet another reform seems to have increased the initial training requirements 
even for contract teachers to one year, too (Ndoye 2004). In Togo, finally, contract teachers do 
not necessarily get any professional training at all. In some cases, they benefit from a three-
month course supported by the World Bank and administered ex post. NGO have also come in to 
bridge the gap, but on an irregular basis. 
Similar cross-country differences exist with respect to educational attainment required to enter 
the teaching profession. While in Guinea and Mali upper secondary education is required as a 
minimum, contract teachers in Niger may also start from a level of completed 10th grade 
(“BEPC”) if they clear the entrance exam. In Togo, the baccalauréat was required initially, but 
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requirements were later reduced to junior secondary completion and the clearance of an entrance 
exam just like in Niger. 
Table 2 shows the magnitude of the contract teacher reforms on the French speaking part of the 
African continent and gives details about their implementation. 
Last but not least, it should be noted that some countries such as Mali and Togo (to some extent) 
develop a career development plan for their contract teachers, e.g. by defining steps on how to 
integrate contract teachers into the traditional system later. In Niger, it is intended to render 
contracts permanent after four years. In surprisingly many countries – including Mali and Togo – 
the contracts for public contract teachers are even supposed to be permanent right from the 
beginning. Nevertheless, contract teachers are clearly in a less secure position than traditional 
civil servants. In Togo, for instance, a large number of contract teachers was fired in 1999 as a 
result of a strike. The differences in contract teacher schemes are summarised in Table 2.  
Let us now consider what kind of effects on student learning we can expect from the various 
features of the contract teacher programmes discussed so far. Theoretically, we will have to 
consider the following potential effects: (1) an effect of the new educational and training 
requirements for entry into the teaching profession, (2) an incentive effect of the teaching 
contract, (3) a selection effect (changed demand for and supply of new teachers), and (4) a 
dynamic effect. Let us consider these effects individually. 
 
 
 10
Table 2: Characteristics of West African contract teacher programmes 
Country Category 
(local names) 
Reasons 
for reform 
Minimum level of 
education and training 
Duration of 
professional pre-
service training 
Duration of contract Career plan or 
seniority 
bonus 
Source of 
financing 
Employer 
Management 
Regularity of 
payment 
State contract 
teachers 
limited state 
resources 
Junior secondary Training periods in a 4-
year sequence 
2 years renewable once Under 
discussion 
State State Yes Benin 
Community teachers “Spontaneous” 
schools 
Flexible Flexible   Parents Local Generally yes  
Community teachers  Flexible  fixed-term contract  Regional Community- 
Based 
 Burkina 
Faso 
Contract teachers Limited state 
resources 
Secondary+ Selection 1 year Permanent Yes State / external Decentralized 
level 
Yes 
Vacataire Limited state 
resources 
Secondary+ Selection 1 year Formally 2 years, but 
considered as permanent 
No till 2006 State Decentralized 
level till 2006 
No Cameroon 
Community teachers Local initiatives Flexible  1 year No  Parents Community  
Chad Community teacher Limited state 
resources /creation of 
community schools 
end junior secondary + 
selection process of 
applicants 
9 months on the job; 4 
months for those with a 
diploma 
9 months (school year) but 
can be transformed into 
permanent 
No Parents and 
state 
Community No 
Contract teachers Limited state 
resources 
Junior secondary+ 
selection process 
2 years apprentice ship 
with continuous training 
Formally 2 years, but 
considered as permanent 
No    
Volunteers Local emergency 
program 
Junior secondary+ 
selection process 
not fully documented 1 year, but can be 
transformed into permanent  
Local 
arrangements 
 Community, 
public service 
Yes 
Congo 
(Rep. of ) 
Community teachers 
(benevolents) 
Parental initiative   Limited   Community  
Guinea Contract teachers Limited state 
resources 
Full secondary + 
selection 
9 or 12 months 1 year but can be 
transformed into permanent  
No State Decentralized 
level 
Generally yes  
Contract teachers Frozen recruitment 
for civil servants 
Local initiatives Flexible Formally 1 year, but 
considered as permanent 
Under 
discussion 
State 
HIPC initiative 
State Generally yes Madagascar 
Community teachers Local initiatives Junior or full secondary sometimes No contract No Parents and aid Community No 
Contract teachers 
 
Limited state 
resources 
grades 11 or 12 3 months Permanent In progress State Decentralized 
level 
Yes Mali 
Community teachers Local initiatives Flexible    Donors / 
community 
Communities / 
parents 
 
Temporary staff Junior secondary 3 months Permanent or 1 year None State State Yes Mauritania 
Retirees 
Lack of competencies 
   None State State Yes 
Niger Contract teachers Limited state 
resources 
Junior secondary + 1 
year in teacher training 
school + selection 
1 year Permanent contract after 4 
years of experience 
No  State  + Aid Decentralized 
level 
No 
Senegal Educational 
volunteers 
Limited state 
resources 
Junior secondary+ 
selection process 
3 months ,  6 months 
after 2000 
2 years for volunteers, half 
become permanent  
Yes State Decentralized 
level 
Yes 
“Auxiliaries” or  
Contract teachers,  
Junior secondary+ 
selection process 
from none up to 3years 
 
Permanent State Decentralized Togo 
Community teachers 
(volunteers) 
Limited state 
resources 
Flexible Irregular, only 
administered by NGO 
 
Yes, but limited 
Communities / 
parents / aid  
Communities / 
parents 
Yes 
Note: For further details, see Appendix A, Table A1. 
Sources: Adapted and updated from Mingat (2004), Ndoye (2004) and Duthilleul (2005) using various World Bank education sector Country Status Reports 
  (see e.g. World Bank 2002, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2007 and World Bank (Africa Region) and Pôle de Dakar 2007) and expert communications. 
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(1) The effect of new education and training requirements 
While recent studies show that the duration of teacher education and training is not 
necessarily a strong correlate of teacher quality and student learning (see e.g. Hanushek et 
al. 2005 for the United States; Michaelowa and Wechtler 2006, and Michaelowa and 
Wittmann 2007 for African countries), this outcome appears to result from decreasing 
returns after a certain minimum level of education and training, and/or could be a result of 
the low quality of the educational programmes themselves. For francophone African 
countries, for instance, it has been observed frequently that increasing primary teachers’ 
educational attainment requirements from the BEPC to the baccalauréat does not bring 
about the expected change in student achievement (Michaelowa and Wechtler 2006). On 
the other hand, providing at least some professional training prior to job entry appears to 
be relevant. This is clearly confirmed by prior analysis for Togo (PASEC 2004). From this 
perspective, we would expect that Togolese contract teachers, many of whom might not 
have received any professional training at all, should be particularly disadvantaged.  
If training and other educational requirements are directly related to the status of contract 
teachers, their effect cannot be disentangled from the other effects of the reform. 
However, as we will see later, we typically find some contract teachers whose educational 
attainment and professional training is beyond the minimum level, just as we find 
traditional civil servants with levels lower than officially required. This will give us some 
(albeit limited) scope to control for these effects. 
 
(2) The incentive effect of the teaching contract 
The incentive effect is the focus of what we would like to analyse in this paper. There are 
two possible directions of this effect. On the one hand, the unfavourable conditions of new 
teacher contracts could be regarded as unfair and demotivating, and short-term contracts 
could prevent personal investments in pedagogical training and school specific human 
capital. This is the main reason why many stakeholders in the education system, including 
traditional teachers, teacher unions, and many policy makers, even at ministerial level, are 
strongly sceptical with respect to the reforms and often consider a reversal. As Mali shows 
the greatest difference in salaries (at least initially, at the time our data were collected), 
from this perspective, we would expect the Malian contract teacher programme to be the 
least conducive to teaching quality. At the same time, teachers in Niger suffer from 
irregular payment of teacher salaries. While the recent literature does not suggest any 
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clear relationship between the level of teacher salaries and education quality (see e.g. 
Kremer et al 2005; Hanushek et al. 2005), serious remuneration problems of this kind 
generally remain unconsidered. They may be far more demotivating and thus put the 
programme in Niger in an even more unfavourable position than the Malian.  
On the other hand, contract teacher programs may also bring about incentives conducive 
to better teaching and learning. These aspects seem to dominate in the eyes of policy 
makers in many non-African countries like India where stakeholders appear to be much 
more optimistic about the effect of contract teacher employment on education quality 
(Govinda and Josephine 2004, Duthilleul 2005). For teachers on non-permanent contract 
positions, further employment prospects generally depend (at least to some extent) on 
performance. Among the three countries considered here, non-permanent contracts exist 
in Niger (at least until four years of job experience), for community teachers in Mali, and 
for the majority of community teachers in Togo (i.e. as far as they have not been fully 
integrated into the public administration system yet). This may enhance their teaching 
effort. 
In addition, the specific employment by local communities can be expected to induce 
another, even more relevant incentive effect. In the case of community teachers, parents 
themselves select and pay the teachers, so that firstly, parents have a high incentive to 
monitor, and secondly, the teachers are directly dependent on parents’ satisfaction. This 
should ensure at least a minimum standard of performance such as regular appearance of 
the teachers at their workplace. Preliminary evidence for five West African countries 
indicates that this is indeed the case (Michaelowa and Wittmann 2007). Similar evidence 
is presented by Duthilleul (2005) for India, while Banerjee and Duflo (2006) and Kremer 
et al. (2005) suggest that results are less obvious in this country. In any case, there appears 
to be a general consensus on the relevance of effective monitoring and that in principle, 
local communities are in a favourable position to fulfil this role (Glewwe and Kremer 
2006). 
If there is a positive incentive effect of the kind discussed above, we should expect an 
advantage of the contract teacher programmes in Mali and Togo over the one in Niger. 
The latter relies, almost without exceptions, on public contract teachers alone. In addition, 
comparing Mali and Togo, we might expect an advantage of the Malian system, not only 
due to the higher share of community teachers among the contract teachers (no more now, 
but at the time our data were collected), but also due to the diminishing involvement of 
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parents and communities in Togo’s EDIL, where the share of teachers directly paid by the 
community is declining.  
 
(3) The selection effect 
As far as the selection effect is concerned, the changed employment conditions could lead 
to a different composition of candidates applying for teaching positions. On the one hand, 
the reduced entry requirements could reduce entry costs and increase the attractiveness of 
(temporary) teaching positions. On the other hand, the inferior contract conditions might 
reduce the number of highly skilled candidates. In addition, the generally higher demand 
for teachers would lead us to expect a lower quality of the marginal (newly employed) 
teacher. Given the considerable acceleration of the teacher recruitment process in all 
countries, the latter is likely to dominate.  
In all countries, the newly engaged teachers represent a significant percentage of young 
adults with secondary education attainment. The total number of students annually 
graduating from at least lower secondary education is currently around 30,000 in Mali, 
12,000 in Niger, and 18,000 in Togo (see Appendix A, Table A2). Current annual increase 
in teacher recruitment lies between 2,000 and 3,500 persons. In Niger, the most extreme 
case, this represents about 20% of all qualified graduates. According to estimates of the 
UNESCO-Institute of Statistics (UNESCO-UIS 2006, p. 41) the numbers will still have to 
rise (annual requirements of ca. 6,000 additional teaching positions in Niger, 5,000 in 
Mali and 1,500 in Togo). If the number of graduates remains unchanged, Niger would 
then be in the extreme situation of recruiting half of all young adults with at least lower 
secondary educational attainment as primary teachers. There may thus not be too much 
choice among candidates. As all countries considerably accelerated their recruitment 
along with the introduction of the contract teacher schemes, it is difficult to derive any 
strong hypothesis with respect to the relevance of this effect in the different countries. 
 
(4) The dynamic effect 
The dynamic effect, finally, refers to a potential change of teacher behaviour regarding 
their life cycle planning. In particular, the inferior contract conditions may induce a 
reduced retention period of teaching staff and thus higher turnover. This effect could lead 
to a different distribution of job experience before and after the reform, with a higher 
proportion of young and inexperienced teachers. This in turn is likely to have an impact 
on overall teaching quality (see e.g. Hanushek et al. 2005).  
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However, the actual relevance of this effect depends crucially on general labour market 
conditions. In the case of all three countries considered here, alternative employment 
opportunities in the modern sector are extremely limited. Currently, in Mali and Niger, 
only about one out of four secondary graduates finds a job in the formal, non-agricultural 
economy. In Togo, it is only one out of ten (see Appendix A, Table A2). The dynamic 
effect therefore does not seem to be highly relevant in any of the three countries for the 
time being.  
 
As we will see below, the data at hand will allow us to estimate the overall impact of the 
contract teacher status without, however, allowing us to distinguish between the individual 
effects. A consideration of the dynamic effect cannot be provided at all because we cannot 
observe teachers over time. However, as we have seen, this effect does not appear to be overly 
relevant in our case anyway. 
Taking together the above arguments on education and training, incentives, and selection 
effects, we observe that at least the latter two let us expect Niger to face the greatest 
difficulties with its contract teacher programme. In Niger, potential disincentives through 
irregular pay appear to be high, and positive incentives rather limited as the programme is 
fully anchored in the public administration system. And even the selection effect must be 
expected to be negative due to the limited supply of qualified candidates. With respect to 
Mali, the most critical issue appears to be the incentive effect. If there does exist an important 
disincentive related to low salary levels, Malian contract teachers should do very badly. 
However, if the positive incentive effect related to parental responsibility and community 
monitoring dominates, Mali with its high percentage of community teachers should do rather 
well. The case of Togo can be expected to lie somewhere in between, with a marked 
disadvantage only with respect to its failure to provide pre-service teacher training on a 
regular basis. The econometric part of this paper will show whether these expectations are 
confirmed by the empirical evidence. 
 
3. Data and initial descriptive statistics 
The empirical study of the effect of contract teacher programmes on education quality 
requires comprehensive information on teachers, schools and students. The “Programme on 
the Analysis of Education Systems” (PASEC)1 collects such data for the 2nd and 5th grade of 
                                               
1
 Original French title: “Programme d’analyse des systèmes éducatifs de la CONFEMEN”, whereby 
CONFEMEN stands for the Conference of Francophone Education Ministers (“Conférence des ministres de 
l’éducation des pays ayant le français en partage”). 
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primary schools in francophone sub-Saharan Africa. PASEC generally uses student, teacher 
and director questionnaires that are uniform for a number of core questions, so that results are 
comparable across countries. Education quality is measured in terms of student achievement 
in Math and French, which is assessed using standardized tests for all three countries 
considered here. The Math test contains a wide variety of items ranging from calculus over 
problem solving (application to situations of daily life) to simple geometry. The French test 
covers general understanding and orthography as well as grammar skills. Tests were 
administered in the classroom, item by item, following detailed instructions on the way to 
present each question and the time to be allocated to its response. Test results are coded in 
terms of the percentage of test items answered correctly in each of the two subjects French 
and Math. The tests and their results are not used for any official purposes, i.e. teacher 
assessments, and the final dataset is anonymous (without any names of schools, teachers or 
students). The tests comprise a majority of multiple choice items. The testing language is 
French.  
Students are tested both at the beginning and at the end of the school year (pre-test in autumn 
and post-test in summer) so that a value added approach (Hanushek 1986) becomes possible. 
This is particularly relevant for our study because the effect of a contract teacher who may 
have taught the students only in the year of assessment needs to be distinguished from the 
effect of various other teachers who taught the class before. In francophone Africa, teachers 
tend to vary a lot over the years, i.e. they usually teach the same grade and do not follow the 
cohort. 
PASEC surveys were carried out in Niger and Togo during the academic year 2000/2001, and 
in Mali in 2001/2002. In all cases, the sampling frame consisted of all primary school teachers 
included in the database available at the national Ministries of Education. Teachers of coranic 
schools were not included as they follow a different curriculum and teaching generally takes 
place in Arabic. Teachers in other private schools were included as long as they were 
registered by the Ministry. This was generally the case in Mali and Togo, but some 
community schools may have gone unnoticed or unrecognized.  
In Togo, data was collected as a stratified random sample of teachers, whereby strata were 
defined according to different teacher characteristics related to their education, seniority and 
training. In this way, 120 teachers were drawn at both 2nd and 5th grade, and consecutively, 
12 students were selected at random in their classes. The intended sample thus contained a 
total number of 240 classes and 2880 students. In Niger and Mali, sampling was directly 
geared towards the evaluation of the effect of contract teachers. It was carried out in a way 
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that each inspection, i.e. each school district, should be covered, and within these districts, 70 
out of 140 schools were drawn at random. Within these schools, one class at 2nd grade and 
one class at 5th grade level were randomly selected. Depending on whether the teacher of the 
classes drawn in this way was a civil servant or a contract teacher, a nearby school with 
similar characteristics was selected to provide evidence for the other type of teacher statute. 
Ideally, this procedure should have resulted in an equal number of contract teachers and 
traditional teachers. As, however, it was not always possible to find the opposite category for 
both grades simultaneously in the same school, the final sample does not really correspond to 
this ideal. In Niger, it is equally spread between contract teachers and teachers on traditional 
civil servant positions only for grade 2. In grade 5, we find twice as many civil servants as 
contract teachers. In Mali, contract teachers are overrepresented in the final sample in grade 2, 
whereas traditional teachers are overrepresented in grade 5. In both Mali and Niger, within 
each class, 15 students were randomly selected. In both countries, the intended sample 
therefore includes 4200 students in a total of 280 classes (of which 140 in 2nd and 140 in 5th 
grade). 
To a certain extent, real numbers differ from intended numbers. In Togo, this is mainly related 
to a teacher strike during the initially intended sampling period which led to a one year delay 
of the sampling process and to changes in the actual teacher composition. Moreover, in all 
countries, some schools did not offer both grades to be covered in the survey and appropriate 
replacement schools could not always be found.2  
The following table shows the actual number of classes contained in the data set for each 
country, separately for 2nd and 5th grade. In addition to regular civil servant teachers and 
contract teachers, there are also some other types of teachers, which include, in particular, 
teaching assistants and interns. These teachers are dropped in the analysis as we aim to 
compare the contract teachers with a well defined control group of regular civil servant 
teachers. In addition to this, we also drop teachers with more than 10 years of job experience 
for common support considerations. Since the reforms were enacted only relatively recently 
there cannot be any new contract teachers with more than 10 years of experience. Hence, the 
support of the variable job experience differs between civil servant and regular teachers and 
we need to impose a common support restriction for the nonparametric estimation approach. 
More precisely, in Togo we observe contract teachers up to eleven years of job experience.3 In 
Mali, we observe contract teachers up to eight years of job experience.4 The situation is 
                                               
2
 For further details on the sampling procedures in the three countries, see PASEC (2004, 2005a and 2005b). 
3
 There is also one with 17 and one with 29 years of job experience, who are dropped. 
4
 There is also one with 16 years of job experience, who is dropped.  
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somewhat different in Niger, where the reform was enacted even more recently, in 1998. 
There, we observe contract teachers with only up to four years of job experience, except from 
one with five years and three with eight years. As we attempt to adhere to the same sample 
and variable definitions across countries to keep results comparable, we use 10 years as the 
cut-off point in all countries for the main analyses. In addition, Appendix D shows estimates 
for Niger when only teachers with at most 4 years of job experience are retained. The results 
are very similar. 
Due to this sample restriction only few regular teachers remain in Mali, which is likely to lead 
to rather imprecise estimates.5,6 
 
Table 3: Number of teachers in the datasets 
 Niger Togo Mali 
 
 
2nd grade 5th grade 2nd grade 5th grade 2nd grade 5th grade 
No. of classes 125 140 116 119 139 140 
       
Contract teachers 59 27 40 42 74 50 
Civil servants 58 92 70 64 48 76 
Other teachers 8 21 6 13 17 14 
       
After deleting 'other teachers' and teachers with more than 10 years of job experience 
       
Contract teachers 59 27 38 42 73 50 
Civil servants 33 45 23 28 10 12 
Note:  In Niger, 10 classes were deleted where no or very limited information on student's test scores were 
available. In six classes, there were no test scores available at all, i.e. no tests were conducted. In four 
classes, test score data was available at most for four students. 
In Togo, 6 classes were deleted: 2 classes because of lacking any data on students (presumably since 
teachers had changed), 2 very small classes with only six students and lacking test score data for two of 
them, and 1 class where no test scores were available at all. In addition, there was only one school that 
used double shift class management. This school is deleted as there cannot be any adequate comparison 
school. 
In Mali, one class was deleted, since there were no student test scores available. 
 
 
                                               
5
 If we had used a cut-off point even smaller than ten years we would have lost another 10 regular teachers in 
Mali. There are only few civil servants with less than 10 years of job experience, and 10 teachers with exactly 10 
years of job experience. 
6
 Similar constraints in the number of comparable observations also make it impossible for us to further 
distinguish contract teachers into the groups of public contract teachers and those engaged by parents and local 
communities. 
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Table 4: Selected characteristics of teachers, students and schools in our sample, by country, grade and teacher status 
Variable (range) Mali Niger Togo 
 Grade 2 Grade 5 Grade 2 Grade 5 Grade 2 Grade 5 
Type of teacher Civil 
servants 
Contract 
teachers 
Civil 
servants 
Contract 
teachers 
Civil 
servants 
Contract 
teachers 
Civil 
servants 
Contract 
teachers 
Civil 
servants 
Contract 
teachers 
Civil 
servants 
Contract 
teachers 
Number of students 123 913 146 668 429 709 584 336 245 422 308 464 
Number of classes 10 73 12 50 33 59 45 27 23 38 28 42 
Test scores:   
post-test French 0.44 0.43 0.32 0.34 0.49 0.40 0.28 0.26 0.58 0.58 0.52 0.39 
Test scores: 
post-test Math 0.36 0.42 0.32 0.35 0.47 0.38 0.31 0.28 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.39 
Test scores:   
pre-test French 0.29 0.19 0.33 0.31 0.18 0.16 0.24 0.23 0.39 0.39 0.55 0.41 
Test scores: 
pre-test Math 0.44 0.32 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.32 0.27 0.27 0.49 0.49 0.62 0.54 
Socio-economic 
index based on family 
possessions (1-8) 0.90 0.62 0.96 0.60 2.50 2.37 2.34 2.87 2.65 1.95 3.71 1.96 
Index of school 
equipment (0-16) 5.48 4.85 4.82 4.90 3.78 3.90 3.77 4.31 4.29 3.00 5.68 3.23 
 
Class size 71.41 63.51 58.77 54.33 46.00 45.68 34.43 36.14 40.46 38.36 32.81 36.83 
School located in 
rural area (0,1) 0.10 0.50 0.36 0.52 0.34 0.38 0.30 0.41 0.40 0.52 0.31 0.58 
Teachers’ age  
(in years) 35.01 29.83 36.53 31.93 30.08 27.79 30.07 28.74 34.62 32.52 36.01 34.09 
Teachers’ job 
experience (in years) 8.43 3.12 7.04 3.82 4.88 2.44 5.58 2.70 6.20 5.47 7.04 5.87 
Teachers’ educational 
attainment (0-6) 2.34 1.61 2.34 2.15 4.01 3.72 4.51 4.18 2.86 2.88 3.82 4.00 
Teachers without pre-
service training (0,1) 0.08 0.34 0.00 0.35 0.03 0.19 0.00 0.15 0.18 0.41 0.22 0.44 
Note:  The pre-test is conducted at the beginning of the school year (in autumn), the post-test is conducted at the end of the school year (in summer). Pre- and post-test are 
based on different items, so that the scores cannot be directly compared. 
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Table 4 provides an overview of some selected characteristics of students, teachers, 
classrooms and schools collected through the additional questionnaires for students, teachers 
and principals. Pupils were questioned along with the pre-test at the beginning of the school 
year, whereas teachers and principals were interviewed at the end of the year. The 
questionnaires provide information on a wide range of students’ personal characteristics, 
family background, and prior educational history, as well as on personal characteristics and 
pedagogical methods of teachers and principals, and on school and classroom equipment, 
inspections, and interaction of school staff with the local community. In addition to those 
variables selected for Table 4, some more variables are listed in Appendix A, Table A3. But 
even the variables presented in the annex only represent a small subset of the overall 
information available. In Table 4, the columns show the averages of the different variables for 
classes taught by contract teachers and civil servant teachers respectively.7 
Starting with test scores, Table 4 indicates that on average, in the sample for both 2nd and 5th 
grade, students taught by traditional teachers typically reached a higher or about equal 
percentage of correct answers than students taught by contract teachers. Only in the case of 
Mali 2nd grade Mathematics, we observe strongly higher scores with contract teachers. 
However, these differences may be related to factors other than the teachers’ contract status. 
They may, for instance, be a consequence of the assignment of contract teachers to different 
learning environments, or to different characteristics of the teachers themselves.  
In particular, it might be that contract teachers get to work with children who show lower 
abilities already at the beginning of the school year. The data provide some evidence for this 
in Togo 5th grade and in Mali 2nd grade. Moreover, at least in Mali and Togo, our data show a 
more favourable context for traditional teachers in terms of the socio-economic background of 
                                               
7
 For some observations data has been missing as in some (rare) cases, teacher and director questionnaires were 
not duly filled in. Generally, when full questionnaires or test results were missing, the observations concerned 
had to be deleted from the data set. Whenever only information for individual variables was missing, however, 
missing values could generally be imputed using related questions taken from the same or other questionnaires. 
If information from several other variables could be included for imputation, imputation was carried out using 
linear regression on all of these variables. In addition, missing value indicators were generated. In other cases, 
the students’ final scores are missing due to their absence on the day of the post-test. These missing values at the 
student level account for the bulk of missing observations. As in most of francophone sub-Saharan Africa, a 
relatively high rate of absence on the day of the final exam can be explained by early drop-out, by sickness, or by 
household and harvesting activities on the day of the evaluation. Simple correlation indicates that the occurrence 
of these missing values is independent of the teacher’s statute as a civil servant or a contract teacher. We did 
some preliminary experiments with including missing value indicators in the regressions, which did not affect 
the results very much. 
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their students and school equipment. In addition, we tend to find contract teachers more often 
in rural than in urban schools. At the same time, for class size, there is no obvious advantage 
of either type of teachers. 
Overall, the differences with respect to socio-economic background and educational resources 
are not very pronounced, and this should indeed not be the case given the PASEC sampling 
strategy, at least for Mali and Niger. However, with respect to teacher characteristics, we must 
expect considerable differences reflecting the relatively recent introduction of the contract 
teacher programmes and the legal constraints related to their implementation. At the same 
time, our modifications to the sample in order to insure common support for the age and job 
experience variables should already have brought about a certain convergence of mean values. 
Indeed, in our remaining sample, contract teachers are generally not more than two years 
younger and less experienced than traditional teachers. An exception is Mali, where we get 
differences up to about five years.  
With respect to teachers’ educational attainment, contract teachers show somewhat lower 
credentials than traditional teachers in Mali and Niger. The opposite is the case in Togo where 
the “baccalauréat” was temporarily imposed as an entrance condition for contract teachers. 
Indeed the value 4 of the education index, which we find in Togo 5th grade for contract 
teachers, stands for the level of the “baccalauréat”. Despite prevailing regulations, this level is 
not reached by 2nd grade teachers, however. In Niger, the education level in our sample is 
lowest. Again this provides some evidence that official regulations are not observed. The 
average educational attainment of the teachers in Niger in our sample is in fact below the 
“BEPC” lower secondary attainment and corresponds to clearing grade 8-9. 
Similarly, professional pre-service training that should have been attended (albeit for a short 
period of time) by all contract teachers in Mali and Niger, does not seem to have regularly 
been required in practice. While in Mali, the problem may come from the community 
teachers, there is no explanation of this kind for the case of Niger. Almost all traditional 
teachers in Mali and Niger, however, report having effectively participated in at least some 
pre-service training activities. Here again, this is not the case in Togo where it was officially 
required but not effectively offered for candidates to the teaching profession. 
While being instructive about the only weakly binding character of public rules and 
regulations in our three countries, the above discussion does not offer any clear explanations 
for the difference in student achievement reached by contract teachers and traditional teachers 
respectively. Nevertheless, some differences remain and it appears to be worthwhile to 
compute the net effects by controlling for all confounding variables. In addition to the small 
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set of variables presented here for illustrative purposes, a much larger number of variables can 
be used as a basis to select appropriate controls. Both the variable selection and the actual 
estimation procedure will be described in detail in the following section. 
 
4. Nonparametric evaluation of the impact of the contract teacher programme on 
education quality 
To evaluate the impact of the contract teacher status on education quality, let 0iY  denote the 
outcome, e.g. Math and French proficiency at the end of the school year, of child i if being 
taught by a regular civil servant teacher. 1iY  represents the outcome of child i if being taught 
by a contract teacher instead. The average impact of the teacher's contract on a randomly 
drawn child is 
1 0[ ]E Y Y− . 
While the average treatment effect provides an overall assessment of the average impact of 
the contract teacher programme, it is also of particular interest how the contract teachers 
change the distribution of the outcomes. Contract teachers may perform poorly e.g. with less 
or very able children. Even if the average treatment effect was zero, an increase in educational 
inequality could be considered as a negative impact of the contract teacher programme. For 
considering the distributional impact, we would like to estimate the distribution functions 1YF  
and 0YF  of the potential outcomes and/or the quantile treatment effects:  
1 0( ) ( )Q Y Q Yτ τ− , 
where ( )Qτ ⋅  refers to the τ-Quantile of the random variable in brackets.8 The quantile 
treatment effects show the impact of the contract teacher programme for children at different 
locations in the ability distribution. If the treatment effects obey rank invariance such that an 
individual i who scores higher than an individual j if taught by a regular teacher also scores 
higher if both are taught by a contract teacher, and vice versa, this is the effect for an 
individual with ability τ. If ranks may cross-over in that the relative orderings of two 
individuals might change when taught by a contract teacher instead of a regular teacher, and if 
this change in the ranks is not fully random but related to the treatment variable, we cannot 
directly associate the τ quantile treatment effect with the individual with ability τ. Still it will 
                                               
8
 Note that we are examining only the quantiles of the potential outcomes and not of the treatment effects. 
Identification of 1 0( )Q Y Yτ −  would require additional assumptions on the joint distribution of the potential 
outcomes, which we do not want to impose. For considerations of educational inequality, the quantiles of the 
potential outcomes are sufficient. 
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be possible to examine the impact of contracts teachers on educational equality to see whether 
contract teachers compress or widen the outcome distribution. Overall it nevertheless seems 
reasonable that rank invariance should at least approximately hold: a weak pupil would still 
remain in the lower end of the outcome distribution if taught by a contract teacher, and vice 
versa.9  
Since we are interested not only in, say, the median treatment effect, but in the entire outcome 
distributions, we estimate the entire distribution function of the potential outcomes. 
Identification is based on the conditional independence assumption 
 
1 0
, |Y Y D XC ,     (1) 
as e.g. in Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997), Lechner (1999), Black and Smith (2004) or 
Firpo (2007). The binary variable iD  indicates whether child i was actually taught by a 
contract teacher ( iD =1) or by a regular civil servant teacher ( iD =0).  
The conditional independence assumption requires that X contains all variables that 
determined the teacher statute and at the same time had an impact on the child's potential 
outcomes. We include in X a large number of variables characterizing the school (location, 
equipment and facilities, management and parental involvement), the socioeconomic 
background of the parents, and the child's proficiency in French and Mathematics at the 
beginning of the school year (pre-test scores). As mentioned before, the pre-test scores are 
very important for the plausibility of our identification approach as they reflect the child's 
otherwise unobserved ability as well as the impacts of previous inputs into the education 
production process. In addition, several teacher characteristics are included to ensure that the 
estimated impacts of contract teachers on student achievement are not due to differences in 
these other characteristics, e.g. job experience. 
By the conditional independence assumption, we can identify the distribution functions of the 
potential outcomes by noting that 
, d=0,1   (2) 
where the last equality sign follows from the conditional independence assumption (1). Now 
the quantiles can be derived by inverting the estimated distribution function. The treatment 
effects are thus fully nonparametrically identified by first estimating the conditional 
distribution functions nonparametrically and averaging then over the empirical distribution 
of X.  
                                               
9
 It is rather the scarcity of teachers that led to the hiring of additional contract teachers and not a selective 
dismissal and replacement of regular teachers by contract teachers. The latter could have been an endogenous 
choice based on the anticipated treatment effects and could violate rank invariance. 
( ) XddY dFdDXaYEaYEaYaF d ∫ =≤=≤=≤= ],|)(1[)](1[)Pr()(
 23 
A nonparametric matching estimator of the potential outcome distribution is 
, d=0,1    (3) 
where ˆ am  is a nonparametric regression estimator of  
 ( , ) [1( ) | , ]am x d E Y a X x D d= ≤ = =    , d=0,1.   (4) 
This nonparametric matching estimator is preferred to traditional regression analysis for two 
reasons: First, we want to avoid arbitrary functional form assumptions for which no 
justification can be given. Second, nonparametric regression allows for endogenous control 
variables that are not permitted in OLS or logit regression (Frölich 2006b).10 This is 
particularly relevant here because of the inclusion of the ability tests at the beginning of the 
school year as control variables. These ability tests are correlated with unobserved ability that 
also likely influences the test results at the end of the school year. 
There are several ways to estimate the conditional expectation function ( , )am x d . A common 
choice would be Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression (= local constant regression). However, 
Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression is known to behave poorly in boundary regions (Fan 
1992, Fan and Gijbels 1996). Instead of the local constant model implied by the Nadaraya-
Watson kernel regression, a local linear or local parametric model is often more appropriate 
(Fan and Gijbels 1996). In particular, using a local parametric model that is closer to the true 
conditional mean function reduces bias (Gozalo and Linton 2000). Since ( , )am x d  is bounded 
between zero and one, a local logit specification is used to implement the boundedness 
restriction in a natural way. The implementation of the estimator follows Frölich (2007) 
where the conditional expectation functions [1( ) | , ]E Y a X D≤  are estimated by local logit as 
in Frölich (2006a). More technical details on the estimator are provided in Appendix B. 
The identification strategy requires [1( ) | , ]E Y a X D≤  to be well defined for every value in 
the support of X. This, in other words, requires that for every value of X contract teachers and 
regular teachers are observed. As mentioned in Section 3, we observe a wide range in the job 
experience of civil servant teachers but no or only extremely few contract teachers with more 
than 10 years of job experience. Hence the conditional mean would not be well defined for 
being contract teacher with a large job experience. Therefore all observations with more than 
10 years of job experience are dropped, which also mitigates the differences in the age 
distribution. 
 
                                               
10
 In other words, nonparametric matching relaxes the assumptions about the independence of the error term. 
Whereas in a traditional linear model it must be assumed that the error term is independent of the regressors, i.e. 
∑=≤
i
ia
d dXm
n
aY ),(ˆ1)r(Pˆ
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5. Empirical results 
The following tables and graphs provide the estimated quantile treatment effects of the 
contract teacher programme. The results are shown for different sets of regressors X and 
different bandwidth values to examine the robustness of the results.11 
Three different sets of control variables are examined: Xset 1, Xset 2 and Xset 3. The 
regressor set Xset 2 is based on a rather extensive collection of variables that have been used 
as possible predictors of test scores in the literature. Estimation of education production 
functions has become a focus of many studies in recent years including numerous studies for 
developing countries ever since micro survey data have become available in the late 1990s. A 
recent summary is provided in the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2005 on education quality 
(UNESCO 2004). This set includes variables that capture the school environment and 
classroom equipment, school management, characteristics of the teachers and also the 
socioeconomic background of the pupils. In addition, we include French and Math 
proficiency at the beginning of the school year to capture unobserved ability of the pupils.12 
We do not include variables that are likely to have been causally affected by the contract 
teacher status, and would thus represent direct outcomes of the teacher status, such as teacher 
job satisfaction or salary. 
Most of these variables, however, are not correlated with the treatment variable ‘contract 
teacher’. Xset 1 therefore retains only a subset of variables that were significant in class-level 
regressions of the treatment variable on all these regressors in any of the three countries 
considered, see Table 5. 
Table 5 shows a class-level logit regression of contract teacher status on several teacher and 
school and class-average pupil characteristics. The first three columns provide the regressions 
for the extensive regressor set Xset 2, where most coefficients are insignificant. Not 
surprisingly, this is especially the case for Mali and Niger reflecting the initial sampling 
strategy. The last three columns provide the regressions for the smaller Xset 1. Overall, the 
predictive power of Xset 1 is still very large. It should also be noted that some of the variables 
had to be dropped from some of the logit regressions because of coefficients tending to 
infinity due to perfect predictability given the small sample size. This happened with the last 
four variables in Table 5, marked with (-). These variables are retained, however, in the 
                                                                                                                                                   
E[u|X,D]=0, this assumption can be relaxed here to E[u|X,D] = E[u|X], i.e. the error term could still be correlated 
with the regressors X. 
11
 Inference is based on the bootstrap, where entire classes are re-sampled to account for within-class 
dependence. Otherwise, significance levels would be overstated. 500 bootstrap replications. 
12
 This is the essence of the value-added approach (Hanushek 1986). 
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nonparametric regressions on the pupil level, where sample sizes are much larger, since they 
are in fact important predictors of contract teacher status. 
 
Table 5: Determinants of contract teacher status 
 
Dependent variable: Contract teacher Mali Niger Togo Mali Niger Togo 
 Xset 2 Xset 1 
School location:       
   
   
 
Distance to next city at least one 
hour 2.51 -2.84 -1.82 2.14 -0.91 -1.47 
Small village -4.49 3.77 1.29    
Big village -2.14 2.66 -1.53    
       
Pupil variables:   
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
Initial test score French 0.20 0.07 1.47 -0.22 -0.02 0.23 
Initial test score Math -0.29 -0.09 -1.59 0.08 0.00 -0.18 
Indicator for 5th grade class 1.56 -1.49 2.13 -1.18 -0.62 0.94 
Initial test French interacted with grade -0.08 0.00 -0.45 0.04 0.01 -0.07 
Initial test Math interacted with grade 0.06 0.01 0.42 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 
Boy 0.04 -2.72 -0.12    
Age -0.52 0.62 -1.29 0.45 0.15 -0.46 
Socioeconomic status a) 4.06 -4.43 2.13    
Possession of TV, radio, rideo at home -4.66 2.19 -0.47    
Indicator of child labour b) -0.54 0.02 -0.01    
Regularity of meals c) -0.27 -1.54 -2.76    
Number of schoolbooks (0,1,2) d) 0.92 2.00 -6.40 0.20 1.32 -3.20 
Student gets help with studies at home -1.59 3.53 4.77    
Student speaks French at home -2.94 0.67 1.03    
Student repeats the current grade -0.08 1.56 1.14    
Number of grades repeated previously -0.19 -4.50 -0.43    
School variables       
       
Classize (on a typical day) -0.03 0.01 0.02    
Percentage of girls in the class 0.02 -0.04 -0.03    
Number of students in the school 0.00 0.00 0.00    
School equipment e) -0.16 0.45 -0.59    
Drinking water in school 1.44 -2.81 2.20 -0.87 -0.68 -0.04 
Electricity in classroom -1.29 -0.85 -2.69    
School has toilets 0.43 -0.74 -3.18 0.34 0.00 -2.56 
Active involvement of parents in 
school issues 0.39 0.43 -1.80    
Frequent exchange among teachers -0.70 1.37 2.53    
Male Director 1.66 -2.50 1.58 0.91 -0.78 -1.03 
Education of director 0.15 -0.20 -0.31    
Training of director -2.20 0.19 1.59    
School participates in a pilot pro-
gramme, exchange programme etc. -1.63 -0.57 2.78 -0.57 -0.23 1.78 
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Table 5 cont. 
Dependent variable: Contract teacher Mali Niger Togo Mali Niger Togo 
 Xset 2 Xset 1 
Teacher variables       
       
Male Teacher 0.26 -0.90 -0.66    
Age Teacher -0.39 -0.05 -0.26 -0.15 -0.06 -0.12 
Education Teacher -0.28 -0.65 0.56    
Teacher speaks local language 1.94 0.11 0.32    
Inspector's visit during the last year - -1.58 2.47 - -0.83 1.14 
Job experience of teacher (in years) - -1.26 0.14 -0.78 -1.00 0.02 
Double shift teaching -1.63 -2.18 -    
Multi grade class -4.95 0.74 - -1.68 0.98 - 
Blackboard and chalk available in 
class - 0.83 0.21    
Constant 29.44 15.60 25.77 10.30 7.74 10.36 
Number of classes 142 168 129 142 168 129 
Pseudo R2 0.481 0.558 0.579 0.505 0.412 0.440 
Note: Coefficients significant at 5% level are marked in bold, significant at 1% are marked in bold underlined. 
Variable names in bold identify variables included in the regressor set Xset 1. 
a)
 Socioeconomic status: Sum of family possessions: fridge, electricity, flush toilet, access to tab water, plough, 
car, TV, radio, video, adjusted to urban/rural differences (0-1). 
b)
 Indicator of child labour: Student helps with commercial activities, agricultural activities and/or animal 
husbandry (Sum of activities). 
c)
 Regularity of meals: Sum of regularity of breakfast, lunch and dinner. 
d)
 Student has a textbook for French, for Math or both (0-2) 
e)
 Sum of 16 indicators of school equipment: electricity in class, library, lavatory, school canteen, availability of 
drinking water, court yard in school, availability of a sick-room with some medical equipment, sports ground 
with some equipment, garden, fence around the school, office for director, room for teachers, storage room, 
housing for director, housing for a guardian, housing for teachers. 
The difference between Xset 2 and Xset 3 is that the latter also contains the variables 
educational level of the teacher and pedagogical training of the teacher. These two variables 
may be important predictors of educational achievement. At the same time, as they are part of 
the characteristics of the contract teacher status, they must be expected to be directly tied to 
the treatment variable. In principle, by definition, contract teachers receive only very little 
training and are subject to different educational requirements for admission. Hence, a change 
in the treatment variable would automatically entail a change in these two variables such that 
they cannot and should not be used as control variables. In practice, however, it seems that the 
various administrative rules are not always adhered to so that, for instance, teachers may have 
become civil servants without any pre-service training, too (see Section 3). Therefore, we 
examine results with and without these two variables. If effects differed significantly, the 
difference may be attributed to these two variables. 
Table 6 presents the estimated quantile treatment effects for Xset 1. The results for the 
enlarged regressor sets Xset 2 and Xset 3 are provided in Appendix C. All results are reported 
for three different sets of bandwidth values, first for 1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)h h λ = , then for 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)h h λ = , and finally for bandwidths chosen by cross-validation. Bandwidth h1 is 
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used for the French and Math pre-test scores, h2 for all other non-binary regressors, and λ for 
binary regressors. As discussed in more detail in Appendix B, the bandwidths chosen by 
cross-validation are certainly too large, since some kind of asymptotic undersmoothing is 
required for the matching estimator to reduce its bias. We therefore focus our attention on the 
first two sets of results and pay particular attention to the robustness of the results to 
bandwidth values and regressor sets.  
The subsequent graphs (Figures 1-2 for Mali, 3-4 for Niger and 5-6 for Togo) show the 
estimated distributions of the potential outcomes: the solid line shows 1ˆYF  and the dashed line 
0
ˆ
Y
F . The horizontal distance thus reflects the quantile treatment effects displayed in Table 6. 
The graphs to the right show the effects on Math proficiency, the graphs in the middle give 
the effects for French proficiency, whereas the graphs to the left refer to the average of French 
and Math proficiency. Again, for Xset 2 and 3 the corresponding graphs are provided in 
Appendix C. 
The results for the 2nd grade in Niger are very stable to bandwidth choice and the set of 
regressors. The effects are close to zero for the lower quantiles, and decrease almost 
monotonously to about –20 to –25 percentage points for the high ability students. Hence, 
whereas the low ability students do not seem to be affected by the teacher status, the high 
ability students seem to suffer from being taught by a contract teacher. The effects are very 
similar for French and for Math. 
For the 5th grade, the estimates also tend to be negative but are small and insignificant. At the 
lower quantiles the effects remain slightly negative with the larger regressor sets 2 and 3. For 
the higher quantiles, the estimation results are unclear and sensitive to the choice of regressors 
included. (For Math, the effects tend to be negative. For French the results are unstable due to 
local colinearity.)13 
In Togo the impacts tend to be positive for the 2nd grade and negative for the 5th grade. The 
positive effects for the 2nd grade are a bit larger for French than for Math. For French, they are 
significant around the median (about 10 to 14 percentage points) while they remain 
insignificant for Math. The estimates with Xset 2 and 3 are similar with often somewhat 
larger effects on Math.  
                                               
13
 The kink in the estimated regression curve at higher quantiles for French for Xset 2 and particularly for Xset 3 
is due to some kind of a locally high correlation among regressors. Therefore results for an additional regressor 
set Xset 3a are reported, where five disturbing variables have been removed: socioeconomic status, media, child 
labour, small village and active involvement of parents in school matters. For this Xset 3a the previously 
positive effects for French at higher quantiles vanish almost entirely. See the columns for Niger 5th grade in 
Table C.2. 
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The situation is different for the 5th grade. Here the effects are about zero for the low 
quantiles, and then decrease almost monotonously until –13 percentage points for Math for 
the high ability students. This pattern is very stable across bandwidth choices and Xsets. 
Effects are negative for both French and Math but more strongly so for Math. 
In Mali, to the contrary, effects tend to be positive for both grades. For the 2nd grade, effects 
are insignificant for French, but significantly positive for Math. Judging from the significance 
levels, this effect seems to be most precise for the lower to medium quantiles. This implies 
that children at the lower end of the ability distribution seem to benefit most clearly from the 
contract teachers. The effects are smaller and less precisely estimated for Xsets 2 and 3 but 
remain positive for Mathematics, perhaps except for very large quantiles. 
For the 5th grade, the effects are also positive for French and Math for the low to medium 
quantiles, but again significant only for Math and now only at the 10% level. For Xsets 2 
and 3 the results are less precise and smaller. Hence, the evidence is less stable for the 5th 
grade, but overall tends to be positive rather than negative. 
All in all, the above analysis quite strongly confirms our expectations that given the different 
characteristics of the contract teacher programmes in the three countries considered, we 
should also observe quite different results. As suggested by our initial hypotheses on both the 
incentive and selection effects, the contract teacher programme in Niger shows the worst 
results, i.e. either insignificant or clearly negative. To the contrary, the Malian results are 
consistently positive and significant in Math for both grades. This suggests that the potentially 
negative role of low salaries (if any) was overcompensated by the positive incentive effect 
induced notably by parental responsibility and monitoring in the case of Malian community 
teachers. As expected, Togo occupies an intermediate position which may be related to the 
fact that parental monitoring responsibility was reduced through the integration of parts of the 
contract teachers into the public administration system.  
One could also suspect that Togo’s relatively bad performance of contract teachers in 5th 
grade is related to their missing pedagogical training. However, the use of Xset 3 where this 
variable is controlled for, does not lead to any significant change. There is thus no evidence 
that the lack of training could drive the results. At the same time, as stated earlier, it may not 
be possible to fully separate the effect of education and training from the treatment itself. This 
aspect must therefore be interpreted with caution. 
The second general observation is that results do indeed differ depending on students’ ability 
level. Across all countries, the analysis by quantile of the ability distribution suggests that 
contract teachers do a relatively better job in low ability contexts. Whenever we observe 
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positive effects, they tend to become significant in low quantiles, and whenever we observe 
negative effects, they tend to become significant in high quantiles of the ability distribution. 
This implies that contract teachers tend to reduce inequalities in the student distribution. 
In Mali and Togo, we also observe that contract teachers tend to be relatively more successful 
with younger students, i.e. they show a better performance in 2nd as compared to 5th grade. 
However, the opposite is the case in Niger. Overall, the influence of contract teachers is thus 
more clearly related to student ability within each grade level than to students’ ability 
difference across grades. 
A possible explanation for this phenomenon could be that traditional civil servant teachers 
may be unwilling to move to disadvantaged areas, and unmotivated if they are still compelled 
to do so. Contract teachers, however, are often locally recruited and should therefore not face 
this problem. Moreover, coming from a similar background, they are more aware of the 
specific problems of children with learning deficiencies; they speak their language, know 
their parents and thus may be better able to deal with the situation. Contract teachers may thus 
outperform traditional teachers in a low-ability context, even if traditional teachers do better 
in a less disadvantaged student environment. 
 30 
 
Table 6: Quantile treatment effects of teacher status (Xset 1) 
 
 
Mali 2nd  Mali 5th  Niger 2nd Niger 5th Togo 2nd  Togo 5th  
 French Math French Math French Math French Math French Math French Math 
 
bandwidth 0.25 
τ=0.1 -2.5 7.8 11.9 5.5 -2.0 0.2 -0.2 -0.5 4.3 2.5 0.5 -2.7 
τ=0.2 1.8 14.7 15.0 7.2 -1.5 1.3 -3.2 -4.4 10.9 8.0 -2.5 -7.6 
τ=0.3 3.4 22.9 11.9 11.4 0.0 -4.3 -3.5 -2.5 4.4 3.0 -3.4 -9.1 
τ=0.4 5.1 28.3 13.9 10.7 -2.0 -5.6 -2.1 -3.1 7.8 7.9 -3.3 -4.8 
τ=0.5 0.1 33.5 10.6 13.2 -12.9 -11.1 -2.6 -0.2 14.0 5.4 -5.5 -6.8 
τ=0.6 1.6 21.4 6.2 12.9 -19.0 -23.1 -0.1 -2.3 13.9 2.2 -9.5 -7.0 
τ=0.7 3.5 25.3 2.9 13.4 -24.6 -30.1 -0.6 2.7 8.1 2.7 -9.3 -12.7 
τ=0.8 10.0 28.8 2.6 -0.1 -21.3 -25.1 -1.4 -0.5 0.0 6.4 -7.8 -11.9 
τ=0.9 18.9 13.5 9.1 -0.2 -11.4 -10.1 -8.7 -0.5 -1.3 1.9 -6.4 -13.0 
 
bandwidth 0. 5 
τ=0.1 -2.5 7.8 11.9 14.2 -5.7 1.2 0.3 2.4 3.3 5.0 1.1 -3.3 
τ=0.2 1.7 13.3 14.8 8.8 -0.6 -2.3 -0.1 -0.1 5.0 2.7 -5.4 -4.8 
τ=0.3 2.8 22.4 14.0 12.1 0.1 -7.6 0.0 -0.3 3.1 5.5 -2.8 -5.0 
τ=0.4 4.8 27.9 13.9 13.5 -0.7 -5.7 0.2 -2.8 8.3 9.7 -0.6 -3.1 
τ=0.5 -0.2 33.3 16.4 14.8 -5.6 -10.8 0.0 -0.1 13.9 10.2 -0.4 -2.0 
τ=0.6 1.6 21.4 11.8 15.0 -18.7 -13.3 0.5 0.1 15.3 2.5 -0.8 -2.2 
τ=0.7 3.8 25.1 11.7 15.4 -22.0 -21.4 0.2 0.2 15.6 10.3 -5.8 -5.4 
τ=0.8 10.3 29.0 8.3 9.0 -21.9 -21.6 -0.6 -0.1 10.3 9.7 -4.3 -8.9 
τ=0.9 18.9 13.6 12.5 0.7 -11.5 -14.9 -6.0 -4.3 2.8 6.3 -3.6 -12.6 
 
bandwidths chosen by cross-validation 
τ=0.1 -2.4 7.8 8.9 13.0 -7.8 1.2 0.0 2.3 0.2 7.4 -0.2 -3.8 
τ=0.2 2.0 14.6 9.4 12.1 -5.0 -4.8 -0.2 -0.5 3.1 7.7 -5.0 -5.0 
τ=0.3 3.2 22.2 11.0 13.9 -3.1 -9.8 -2.4 -2.3 -0.5 2.1 -2.5 -3.4 
τ=0.4 4.9 27.7 13.7 15.6 -7.5 -12.8 -1.5 -4.6 2.6 7.4 -0.1 -0.2 
τ=0.5 -0.3 31.2 16.5 15.5 -12.8 -12.8 -2.6 -4.7 4.9 8.2 -0.1 -0.4 
τ=0.6 1.4 21.1 9.8 18.2 -18.8 -14.7 -0.1 -2.9 8.2 5.7 -2.1 -2.1 
τ=0.7 3.7 24.6 12.2 18.4 -19.3 -14.5 -2.7 -2.1 10.8 5.9 -3.0 -5.0 
τ=0.8 10.1 28.3 11.5 17.1 -15.7 -13.6 -3.2 -6.1 9.0 8.2 -4.6 -6.8 
τ=0.9 18.8 13.2 14.9 12.2 -3.4 -9.9 -3.7 -2.5 3.1 6.4 -6.7 -9.6 
             
Note: Percentage points treatment effects, significant at 10% are marked in italics, significant at 5% are marked 
in bold, significant at 1% are marked in bold underlined. 
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Figure 1: Potential outcomes for Mali 2nd grade (Xset 1) 
 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure 2: Potential outcomes for Mali 5th grade (Xset 1) 
 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure 3: Potential outcomes for Niger 2nd grade (Xset 1) 
 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure 4: Potential outcomes for Niger 5th grade (Xset 1) 
 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure 5: Potential outcomes for Togo 2nd grade (Xset 1) 
 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure 6: Potential outcomes for Togo 5th grade (Xset 1) 
 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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6. Conclusions  
In this paper we analyzed the impact of the ‘contract teacher’ reforms on educational quality. 
Traditionally, in most countries, teachers are hired as civil servants after a well regulated 
initial education and training period and with clear career advancements tracks. Due to 
financial pressure, high schooling demand and other reasons, many African (as well as Latin 
American and South Asian) countries have experimented with alternative forms to engage 
new teachers, usually providing only fixed term contracts with lower remuneration and 
reduced entry requirements. In this paper we provide an overview of these contract teacher 
reforms in francophone Africa and nonparametrically estimate quantile treatment effects for 
Niger, Togo and Mali. Our empirical analysis is based on data collected by PASEC in several 
francophone African countries, with the advantage that sampling, data collection, ability 
testing, interviewing, data cleaning etc. always follow similar procedures, and that, with few 
exceptions, variables are always coded and defined in the same way. 
Our estimations point to two major findings. First it seems that contract teachers do relatively 
better for low ability than for high ability students. When positive treatment effects are found, 
they tend to be more positive at the low to medium quantiles, and when negative effects are 
observed they tend to be more pronounced at the high ability quantiles. This pattern is 
remarkably stable across countries, and most pronounced for Niger 2nd grade and Togo 5th 
grade. This suggests that relative to traditional civil servant teachers, contract teachers are in a 
better position to work in a more difficult learning environment and to react to the needs of 
students with the most serious learning deficiencies. Thereby, they tend to reduce existing 
inequalities in overall student outcomes. 
Second, we observe clear differences in the impact of contract teachers between the three 
countries. The treatment effects are highly negative for Niger in the 2nd grade and tend to be 
very small, and slightly negative, for the 5th grade. In Togo we found clearly positive effects 
for 2nd grade students. For the 5th grade, the effects were very small and negative for low 
ability but very large and negative for high ability students. Here contract teachers do well in 
low grades, but clearly fail in the 5th grade for the more advanced students. In contrast, in 
Mali, the treatment effects tend to be positive for both 2nd and 5th grade, particularly in 
Mathematics. 
Hence, when ordering the three countries by their overall effects, we find that effects are 
positive in Mali, somewhat mixed in Togo (with positive effects in 2nd and negative effects in 
5th grade) and negative in Niger. This ordering can be related to the details of the 
implementation of the contract teacher programme. In Mali and Togo, contract teachers have 
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been introduced in a less centralized way and, especially in Mali, the system continues to 
work predominantly through the local communities. This could have led to a closer 
monitoring and more effective hiring of contract teachers, which may have contributed to this 
positive outcome. In Niger, apart from the centrally governed overall approach, the very fast 
hiring of huge numbers of contract teachers relative to a rather limited base of qualified 
secondary graduates may also have contributed to poor performance.  
Hence, a focus on local community and parental involvement in hiring and monitoring 
contract teachers as well as a gradual rather than immediate reform process seem to be 
warranted.  
Overall, our results thus indicate that the success or failure of contract teacher programmes in 
terms of student performance depends on a careful implementation of the system. Despite 
lower pay and adverse working conditions, the incentive effect may be positive, especially if 
teachers are directly engaged by parents or the local community. In this case they will feel the 
recognition of their effort and they can also be directly held responsible for their work.  
These findings are encouraging, especially if we consider that in terms of purely quantitative 
objectives such as universal primary education, hiring contract teachers appears to be 
inevitable. According to the most recent UNESCO estimates, until the year 2015, 60 000 new 
teaching positions must be created in Niger, 55 000 in Mali and 12 000 in Togo (UNESCO-
UIS 2006, p. 41). Taking into account the usual rates of turnover and attrition, it could be 
estimated that overall about 150 000 teachers will have to be recruited in the three countries. 
This number is twice as high as the stock of teachers currently on the job.  
Our results suggest that the involvement and empowerment of parents and local communities 
can help to face this challenge. It should be noted, however, that relying on the cooperation of 
these groups tends to reinforce existing inequalities. If poor communities pay and monitor 
their teachers while other well to do schools are equipped and managed by public authorities, 
education policy becomes unacceptably regressive. The new challenge therefore is to achieve 
a pro-poor distribution of educational expenditure while, at the same time, encouraging local 
initiative and autonomy.  
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Appendix A: Additional information about the contract teacher reforms, labour market 
conditions and the data set 
 
Table A.1: Additional information on contracts teachers in francophone sub-Saharan 
Africa (primary education)1 
 
Country 
Total 
number of 
teachers, 
2004 
EFA staff 
needs,  
20152 
Types of  
contract teachers  
(local names)3 
Contract teachers in %  
of national primary 
teaching staff, 2003 
Recent 
trends 
Contract teacher salaries as compared to salaries for full 
rank civil servants (details and trends) 
Contract teachers 24%  35% 
Benin 25,600 49,300 
“Communautaires” 30% (2006)  
17%  and without any bonuses, since recently mainly paid by 
the central government budget (in 2006 only about one sixth, 
i.e. ca. 1,000, paid by parents and local communities) 
Contract teachers  24%  80% 
Burkina Faso 23,400 76,500 
Community teachers 12%   30-35% 
“Instituteurs vacataires” 
(IVAC) 24%  
Sharp 
increase 
25% to 40%  (=90$ to 140$ per month); in 2006, a process 
started to integrate experienced IVAC into the civil service 
Cameroon 55,300 78,000d Community teachers 
“maîtres de parents” 45%  
Decrease 
 
Local arrangements, ca. 30$/month for seven months per year 
Chad 16,200 61,200 
Community teachers 
 
Public contract teachers 
65%  
 
< 0,5% of teaching staff) 
Permanent 
increase 
Decrease 
Variable, typically 20% to 40%4 
Congo,  
Rep. of  7,100 26,400 
Contract teachers 
Volunteers 
Community teachers 
4% 
14% 
30% 
 
 
Increase 
100%, on nine months per year 
Volunteers 45% to 80% also on nine months 
Variable, estimates range from 30%  to 60% 
Guinea 25,400 48,200 
Contract teachers 
Community teachers 
54% (2005) 
< 2% (2005)5 
Increase 
Decrease 
55% 
33%  
Madagascar 64,300 89,600 Contract teachers (various types) 59% (2004)
 
5
 
Increase 
30% to 50%  for state contract teachers, depending on types, 
figures are rapidly changing 6 
Mali 26,700 82,200 Contract teachers (various types) 65% (2004) 
Overall 
increase  
Temporary staff ca. 8% (2004) Hourly wages 
Mauritania 9,800 16,900 
retirees marginal 
Decrease 
Bonus added to regular pension 
Niger 22,400 82,700 Contract teachers 
56% (2004) plus 0,7% 
acting as teachers during 
civic service.  
Sharp 
increase  
Senegal 32,000 57,100 Educational volunteers contract teacher 42% parents’ teachers 12%   
Togo 22,200 34,100 Contract teachers 
community teachers 
31%  
33 %  Increasing 
40%  
≥16%; typically 25% to 30% for schools run by NGO 
1
 This table does not only provide additional details to Table 1 (and 2) of the text, it sometimes also presents more recent information. This is 
notably the case when the information required for Table 1 is only partially available for the more recent year. 
2
 UNESCO-UIS estimates for total requirement of primary teachers to achieve universal primary education in 2015 
3 In our text, “contract teacher” is used as a general term including all kinds of non-civil servant teachers hired on a contractual basis, 
independently of whether they are engaged by the public administration, the community or other private entities. In the countries, various 
terms are used distinguishing between these groups. The term “contract teacher” then also refers more narrowly to those teachers engaged or 
at least paid by public authorities. However, the terms for subgroups are not used in any uniform way across different countries. 
4
 In some deprived areas, monthly wage is estimated only around 10$. However, in 2005 a plan was set up as to guarantee, through a state 
grant a monthly salary of 45$ for community teachers with, and of 25$ for community teachers without pedagogical training. The former 
represents about half the wage of civil servant auxiliary teachers. The grant is financed through the state’s new petroleum receipts. 
5 While officially, the status of most community teachers was changed into (public) contract teachers in 2004, some doubts remain with 
respect to official statistics. In particular, it has been observed that communities continue to hire their own teachers which are not taken into 
account. 
6
 In early 2007 a five-year plan was launched to hire 13 000 “vacataires” to support the EFA process. 
 
Sources: World Bank (2002, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c 2006a, 2007), World Bank (Africa Region) and Pôle de Dakar (2007), UNESCO-
UIS (2006, p 162). 
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Table A2: School to work transition and alternative labour market opportunities for teacher candidates 
 
  Mali (1998-2004) Niger (2000-2002) Togo (1997-2000) 
Lower secondary attainment 19100 7900 11800 
Upper secondary attainment 6100 2200 4200 
Annual number of graduates 
(labour market supply, skilled or semi-skilled) 
Tertiary attainment 4000 1500 1600 
Professionals (skilled / highly skilled) 670 500 300 Annual job openings 
(labour market demand, skilled or semi-skilled 
and unskilled, modern sector) Semi-skilled and unskilled  6500 3000 1700 
Ratio tertiary graduates / professional positions 6,0 3,0 5,3 
Ratio secondary and tertiary graduates / total modern sector positions 3,9 3,4 9,4 
Sources: World Bank (2002, p. 77, 2004, p. 97, 2006a, p. 141). 
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Table A3: Sample description: averages of student, teacher, and school variables, by country and teacher status 
 
 Mali Niger Togo 
 2nd grade 5th grade 2nd grade 5th grade 2nd grade 5th grade 
 D=0 D=1 D=0 D=1 D=0 D=1 D=0 D=1 D=0 D=1 D=0 D=1 
School location             
             
Next city at least one hour away from school location (dummy) 0.1 0.49 0.26 0.42 0.44 0.17 0.26 0.34 0.34 0.48 0.38 0.31 
School is located in a small village (dummy) 0 0.12 0.2 0.17 0.1 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.29 0.04 0.16 
School is located in a big village (dummy) 0.1 0.35 0.16 0.29 0.24 0.26 0.19 0.26 0.31 0.23 0.28 0.41 
             
Student variables             
             
Student’s initial test score in French (0-100 % of correct answers) 0.29 0.19 0.33 0.31 0.18 0.16 0.24 0.23 0.39 0.39 0.55 0.41 
Student’s initial test score in Math (0-100 % of correct answers) 0.44 0.32 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.32 0.27 0.27 0.49 0.49 0.62 0.54 
Student is a boy (dummy) 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.41 0.6 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.53 0.51 0.58 
Student’s age (7-20 years) 8.4 8.17 12.11 12.14 7.96 8 11.45 11.46 8.11 8.34 10.44 11.81 
Student’s socio-economic background, indicator 3: family possession 
of various consumer and investment goods, adjusted to urban/rural 
differences (0-1) 
0.45 0.37 0.49 0.36 0.32 0.3 0.3 0.36 0.33 0.24 0.46 0.24 
Student’s family possesses a car (dummy) 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.2 0.26 0.17 0.33 0.18 
Student’s family possesses a refrigerator (dummy) 0.28 0.23 0.29 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.16 0.25 0.27 0.13 0.36 0.14 
Student’s family has a flush toilet 0.15 0.14 0.21 0.1 0.25 0.18 0.14 0.2 0.19 0.19 0.27 0.08 
Student’s family has electricity (dummy) 0.52 0.36 0.47 0.29 0.34 0.33 0.29 0.4 0.42 0.29 0.55 0.23 
Student’s family has access to tab water (dummy) 0.39 0.28 0.52 0.2 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.34 0.27 0.16 0.37 0.13 
Student’s family possesses a plough (dummy) 0.26 0.41 0.44 0.56 0.17 0.22 0.2 0.17 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.12 
Student’s family possesses a radio, TV and/or a video player (0-3) 1.94 1.59 1.99 1.67 1.25 1.23 1.34 1.49 1.23 1 1.82 1.2 
Student’s family possesses a video player (dummy) 0.3 0.18 0.33 0.2 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.23 0.2 0.09 0.31 0.13 
Student’s family possesses a radio (dummy) 0.96 0.94 0.97 0.95 0.76 0.77 0.87 0.83 0.69 0.69 0.93 0.81 
Student’s family possesses TV (dummy) 0.67 0.45 0.65 0.47 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.43 0.34 0.23 0.59 0.27 
Student helps with commercial activities, agricultural activities and/or 
animal husbandry (0-3) 2.21 2.14 1.97 2.43 1.07 0.95 1.2 1.15 0.83 1.16 0.94 1.51 
Student helps with field work (dummy) 0.37 0.51 0.45 0.64 0.52 0.46 0.57 0.56 0.35 0.63 0.36 0.74 
Student helps with agricultural work and animal husbandry (dummy) 0.4 0.33 0.23 0.38 0.32 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.37 0.22 0.38 
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Table A3 cont. 
 
 Mali Niger Togo 
 2nd grade 5th grade 2nd grade 5th grade 2nd grade 5th grade 
 D=0 D=1 D=0 D=1 D=0 D=1 D=0 D=1 D=0 D=1 D=0 D=1 
Student helps with commercial activities (dummy) 0.32 0.26 0.25 0.32 0.24 0.22 0.33 0.29 0.2 0.16 0.37 0.4 
Student has breakfast, lunch and/or dinner (0-3) 2.96 2.95 2.94 2.95 2.86 2.88 2.95 2.89 2.65 2.77 2.81 2.61 
Student has breakfast never, sometimes or regularly (0-1) 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 1 1 0.88 0.9 0.95 0.86 
Student has lunch never, sometimes or regularly (0-1) 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.92 0.93 0.97 0.93 0.88 0.93 0.93 0.87 
Student has dinner never, sometimes or regularly (0-1) 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.88 
Student has a textbook for French, for Math or both (0-2) 0.39 0.29 0.72 0.55 0.36 0.38 0.4 0.41 1 0.48 1.34 0.72 
Student gets help with studies at home (dummy) 0.71 0.6 0.75 0.55 0.49 0.52 0.65 0.68 0.6 0.65 0.68 0.55 
Student speaks French at home (dummy) 0.09 0.12 0.42 0.22 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.48 0.41 0.86 0.86 
Student is repeating the 5th grade (dummy)  e) 0.15 0.2 0.27 0.24 0.08 0.1 0.08 0.11 0.2 0.31 0.16 0.22 
Student’s number of previous grade repetitions (0-4) 0.18 0.17 0.41 0.47 0.15 0.09 0.23 0.19 0.31 0.5 0.72 1.2 
             
School variables             
             
Class size 71.41 63.51 58.77 54.33 46 45.68 34.43 36.14 40.46 38.36 32.81 36.83 
Share of female students in the class (0-100%) 45.81 46.07 40.89 42.16 44.14 45.15 45.07 44.92 44.54 46.69 48.44 44.69 
School’s overall number of students (14-2733) 304.28 234.47 251.55 211.24 348.08 368.52 391.95 445.62 511.08 460.43 441.46 512.32 
School equipment indicator, low to high (0-14) 5.48 4.85 4.82 4.9 3.78 3.9 3.77 4.31 4.29 3 5.68 3.23 
School has access to fresh water (dummy) 0.68 0.74 0.74 0.68 0.67 0.58 0.63 0.63 0.56 0.21 0.51 0.3 
Classroom has electricity (dummy) 0.34 0.11 0.25 0.03 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.18 0.27 0.05 0.21 0.05 
School has toilets 0.68 0.75 0.73 0.79 0.57 0.48 0.48 0.64 0.75 0.19 0.75 0.39 
Parents easily mobilized for school issues (dummy) 0.28 0.51 0.27 0.48 0.57 0.76 0.83 0.56 0.6 0.58 0.42 0.43 
Frequent exchange among teachers (dummy) 0.9 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.75 0.84 0.79 0.74 0.96 0.95 0.96 1 
Director is male (dummy) 0.78 0.9 0.66 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.9 0.77 0.95 0.92 0.92 0.89 
Director’s education index, from below primary completion to 3 years 
of higher education and above  (0-6) 3.46 3.08 2.32 3.07 3.98 4.07 3.93 3.88 3.1 3.29 3.2 2.96 
Director received some pedagogical training (dummy) 0.8 0.8 1 0.8 0.88 0.9 0.98 0.85 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.25 
School participates in a pilot project, exchange program etc. (dummy) 0.32 0.24 0.44 0.3 0.36 0.41 0.43 0.19 0.08 0.35 0.19 0.21 
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Table A3 cont. 
 
 Mali Niger Togo 
 2nd grade 5th grade 2nd grade 5th grade 2nd grade 5th grade 
 D=0 D=1 D=0 D=1 D=0 D=1 D=0 D=1 D=0 D=1 D=0 D=1 
Teacher variables             
             
Teacher is male (dummy) 0.29 0.28 0.51 0.71 0.34 0.06 0.47 0.36 1.36 1.32 1.03 1.05 
Teacher’s age (21-60 years) 35.01 29.83 36.53 31.93 30.08 27.79 30.07 28.74 34.62 32.52 36.01 34.09 
Teacher’s education index, from below primary completion to 3 years of 
higher education and above (0-6) 2.34 1.61 2.34 2.15 4.01 3.72 4.51 4.18 2.86 2.88 3.82 4 
Teacher speaks local language (dummy) 0.61 0.73 0.86 0.8 0.9 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.82 0.79 0.75 0.61 
School inspected during the last 12 months (dummy) 1 0.79 1 0.81 0.78 0.83 0.86 0.73 0.57 0.69 0.64 0.79 
Teacher’s job experience (0-40 years) 8.43 3.12 7.04 3.82 4.88 2.44 5.58 2.7 6.2 5.47 7.04 5.87 
Class management in double shifts (dummy) 0.59 0.39 0.5 0.39 0.09 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Class management with multi-grade teaching (dummy) 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.15 0 0.07 0.06 0.04 0 0.1 0 0.02 
Classroom is equipped with a blackboard and chalk (dummy) 1 0.86 0.91 1 0.87 0.93 0.92 1 0.83 0.76 0.75 0.83 
Notes: Range of possible values in parenthesis. 
           Teacher status: D=0 civil servant, D=1 contract teacher. 
Source: PASEC database. 
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Appendix B: Additional details on the econometric methodology 
 
A nonparametric matching estimator of the potential outcome distribution is 
 , d=0,1    (5) 
where ˆ
am  is a nonparametric regression estimator of  
 ( , ) [1( ) | , ]am x d E Y a X x D d= ≤ = = .   (6) 
Since ( , )am x d  is bounded between zero and one, a local logit specification is used to 
implement the boundedness restriction in a natural way. Define * 1( )j jY Y a= ≤ . For estimating 
( , )am x d  at a location x the local log likelihood is maximized among the jD d=  observations 
 { }* *arg max ln ( , ) (1 ) ln(1 ( , )) 1( )
xd
j j xd j j xd j j
j
Y g X Y g X D d K
β
β β+ − − ⋅ = ⋅∑ ,  (7) 
where 
 
'
1( , )
1 j xd
j xd Xg X
e
ββ −=
+
     (8) 
is the logit function and jK  a kernel weight further described below. The coefficients xdβ  
may be different for any value of x and d, and ( , )am x d  is then estimated as 
 
ˆ
ˆ ( , ) ( , )a xdm x d g x β= .     (9) 
Since the local log likelihood function is concave, the maximizer is found usually within very 
few iterations. 
The kernel weighting function jK  assigns larger weights to observations close to x. With Xj 
being multidimensional and also containing a large number of binary regressors, we follow a 
suggestion by Racine and Li (2004) to also smooth over the dummy variables to improve 
precision in small samples, see Racine and Li (2004). A product Gaussian kernel is used for 
the continuous and ordered discrete variables, whereas the dummy variables enter 
multiplicatively with a weight of one if this variable is identical in x and Xj and a weight of 
λ<1 otherwise. Let Xj be a vector of dimension Q where the regressors are ordered such that 
the first element is a constant, the elements 2,...,Q1 are continuous and ordered discrete 
regressors and the last Q1+1,...,Q elements are dummy variables. The kernel weights are 
computed as 
1
,
1
1( ),
2 1
j q q
Q Q
X xj q q
j
q q Q
X x
K
h
φ λ ≠
= = +
− 
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If λ=0, only observations Xj that are identical to x with respect to all dummy variables receive 
positive weights. This corresponds to running separate local regressions within each cell 
defined by the dummy variables. If λ=1, the dummy variables would not affect the kernel 
weights but would enter only in the local approximation plane ( , )j xdg X β . 
In principle different bandwidth values h or λ could be used for every regressor, which 
however would require choosing a very large number of smoothing parameters. Instead we 
distinguish three bandwidths: h1 for the French and Math test scores at the beginning of the 
school year, h2 for all the other non-binary regressors and λ for the binary regressors. Before 
estimation, all the non-binary regressors are rotated such that their sample variance-
covariance matrix is the identity matrix. In other words, these transformed regressors all have 
the same standard deviation and are uncorrelated. This reduces colinearity problems and also 
ensures that the effective bandwidth is about proportional to the standard deviation of each 
variable. 
For choosing bandwidth values for nonparametric regression, least-squares cross-validation is 
a frequently used approach. For matching estimators, where the nonparametric regression 
enters only as a plug-in and is then averaged over, it is well known that some asymptotic 
undersmoothing is required to reduce the order of the bias term. However, no data-driven 
bandwidth selectors for matching estimators based on local logit regression seem to be 
available so far. Therefore, we pursue a rather conservative approach in that we estimate the 
potential outcome distributions for bandwidth values chosen by leave-one-out least-squares 
cross-validation14 and for two sets of fixed bandwidth values: 1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)h h λ =  and 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)h h λ = . We expect the cross-validation bandwidths to generate a larger bias and 
will therefore concentrate on the latter two bandwidth choices to examine sensitivity of the 
estimates to the bandwidth values. Only if the estimates appear to be rather stable, one would 
be confident to trust in the results.15 
The precise implementation of the local logit estimator follows Frölich (2006a). For any given 
bandwidths values it may occur that for some locations x and d the local likelihood estimator 
is not well defined, e.g. due to local near-colinearity or perfect prediction. This happens 
                                               
14
 The bandwidths were chosen by leave-one-out least-squares cross-validation separately for the D=0 and the 
D=1 subsample, and separately for each country, grade and Xset. The list of all different bandwidth values is 
available from the authors upon request. They were computed for the joint achievement variable French and 
Math first and then also used for each of the subjects separately. 
15
 This procedure seems also be justified by the finding that many data-driven bandwidth selectors converge only 
very slowly to the true optimal bandwidth. Hence, although being consistent, the bandwidth values chosen for a 
particular sample might be very variable and one would still like to examine sensitivity of the estimates to 
alternative bandwidth choices. 
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particularly for small bandwidth values and in regions of sparse data. When this happened, the 
bandwidths are locally, proportionally increased, repeatedly until a valid estimate is obtained. 
If the repeated local increases of the bandwidth values did not lead to convergence, the 
regressors causing local near-colinearity were dropped locally. 
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Appendix C: Robustness analysis, additional estimation results 
The following tables and graphs show the estimated distribution functions and quantile treatment effects for the 
larger Xsets 2 and 3, respectively. For the 5th grade in Niger additional results are shown for an Xset 3a, in 
which the five variables socioeconomic status, media, child labour, small village and active involvement of 
parents have been dropped. These variables induce serious local multicolinearity problems which lead to a 
conspicuous kink at the higher quantiles in the estimated distribution functions for Niger 5th grade with Xset 3. 
To avoid this pattern of the estimates, which is more likely to be an artefact of high correlation of regressors 
than a true feature of the potential outcomes, we dropped these variables to examine the robustness of the 
estimates. 
Table C.1: Quantile treatment effects (Xset 2) 
 
 Mali 2nd  Mali 5th  Niger 2nd Niger 5th Togo 2nd  Togo 5th  
 French Math French Math French Math French Math French Math French Math 
bandwidt 0.25 
    
 
 
 
  
  
  
τ=0.1 -2.8 4.1 0.4 -0.1 -4.9 0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -6.5 -7.1 -5.4 -1.4 
τ=0.2 1.4 3.5 2.8 0.7 -2.5 4.2 -3.2 -2.6 0.2 -6.1 3.2 -1.9 
τ=0.3 3.5 3.3 -2.5 3.6 -0.1 0.4 -8.2 -7.6 5.1 2.1 0.5 -0.3 
τ=0.4 2.2 5.1 -0.1 5.7 2.0 -7.2 -0.9 -6.5 7.7 5.5 -3.2 -2.3 
τ=0.5 -14.0 6.1 -3.2 3.5 -5.1 -15.1 -3.0 -4.9 3.3 11.4 -11.0 -7.1 
τ=0.6 -13.3 3.0 -3.0 7.8 -21.0 -25.6 -0.2 1.9 -1.3 5.1 -15.1 -13.6 
τ=0.7 -11.6 4.9 -2.3 4.3 -26.2 -21.8 3.2 1.8 -1.5 10.0 -16.6 -15.4 
τ=0.8 -13.1 -0.3 2.2 4.6 -11.1 -17.1 5.6 4.8 -1.8 8.4 -9.5 -13.1 
τ=0.9 -8.3 -18.2 2.1 5.1 -4.9 -9.4 13.7 -5.3 -2.5 9.5 -8.3 -10.3 
             
bandwidth 0.5 
            
τ=0.1  -2.4   4.5  0.7 3.0 -2.3 2.8 -2.6 -1.7 -0.1 -4.6 2.3 0.1 
τ=0.2  1.6   3.5  2.9 2.1 -4.1 1.7 -5.5 -6.2 7.4 -2.2 3.3 2.4 
τ=0.3  3.7   3.1  -2.3 4.9 0.3 -2.6 -0.9 -8.2 8.4 5.5 -2.4 -0.2 
τ=0.4  2.2   5.2  -0.1 5.9 0.3 -8.6 -1.6 -4.6 13.5 7.7 -0.5 -0.1 
τ=0.5 -16.2   5.9  -3.2 3.6 -5.5 -17.4 -0.2 0.2 5.3 11.6 -7.7 -5.2 
τ=0.6 -13.5   2.7  -2.9 7.8 -24.0 -17.9 0.4 2.0 -1.2 13.4 -8.6 -6.3 
τ=0.7 -13.1   2.1  -2.4 4.2 -27.1 -26.5 3.1 0.5 -3.7 12.9 -10.5 -13.3 
τ=0.8 -13.8   -1.8  -0.1 1.9 -22.0 -20.1 -0.3 0.6 -4.4 7.9 -10.7 -14.9 
τ=0.9 -11.0  -20.0  1.8 1.9 -7.8 -15.1 16.6 -2.1 -2.9 6.8 -6.7 -10.6 
             
bandwidth cv 
            
τ=0.1 -2.4 5.1  3.1   4.5  -5.7 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 2.3 3.0 0.3 -1.4 
τ=0.2 1.5 5.0  3.2   2.2  -3.1 -1.7 -0.5 -6.3 11.0 2.0 -5.2 -2.9 
τ=0.3 3.4 4.5  -2.3   4.8  -3.0 -8.1 -2.3 -5.0 10.8 9.7 -2.6 -4.4 
τ=0.4 2.0 5.1  -0.2   5.8  0.1 -9.9 0.0 -0.4 11.0 9.9 -3.9 -2.8 
τ=0.5 -16.7 5.8  -3.5   3.3  -4.4 -8.0 2.9 2.9 3.0 7.7 -7.5 -6.8 
τ=0.6 -13.3 2.6  -3.1   7.6  -19.0 -10.4 5.6 1.6 -0.9 9.7 -8.5 -6.8 
τ=0.7 -11.5 1.7  -2.4   3.8  -19.6 -16.2 3.4 0.1 -3.6 10.1 -8.9 -7.2 
τ=0.8 -13.1 -2.0  -0.3   1.8  -19.1 -15.8 1.6 0.1 -4.8 3.3 -7.2 -9.2 
τ=0.9 -10.7 -19.6  1.7   0.2  -9.6 -12.6 -3.5 -4.8 -0.6 2.4 -6.3 -13.1 
             
Note: Percentage points treatment effects, significant at 10% are marked in italics, significant at 5% are marked in bold, significant at 
1% are marked in bold underlined. 
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Table C.2: Quantile treatment effects (Xset 3) 
 
 Mali 2nd  Mali 5th  Niger 2nd Niger 5th Niger 5
th
   
Xset 3a Togo 2
nd
  Togo 5th  
 French Math French Math French Math French Math French Math French Math French Math 
bandwidt 0.25 
    
 
 
         
τ=0.1 -3.6 4.8 -6.0 -8.1 -3.7 0.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 -6.1 -5.1 -7.3 -6.3 -1.9 
τ=0.2 -1.8 9.9 -5.6 -1.7 -3.0 2.9 -5.7 -6.6 -2.9 -9.7 -2.3 -3.0 -0.1 -3.6 
τ=0.3 0.1 8.4 -8.5 -4.9 -0.3 4.8 -6.0 -12.2 -6.0 -11.3 -3.3 3.0 -5.5 -3.0 
τ=0.4 -2.5 8.2 -8.7 -2.4 -0.3 -4.1 -0.2 -11.1 -4.5 -9.0 -0.1 4.6 -6.2 -6.2 
τ=0.5 -0.3 8.1 -6.1 -6.7 -5.1 -12.0 0.4 -1.7 -2.9 -4.5 8.2 2.0 -8.2 -9.6 
τ=0.6 1.7 5.6 -3.0 -3.7 -24.2 -26.2 5.6 2.0 2.3 1.1 8.0 1.9 -14.4 -8.7 
τ=0.7 4.8 11.4 0.1 -0.4 -27.0 -22.6 19.4 7.9 0.6 1.7 6.6 7.7 -11.2 -14.6 
τ=0.8 8.1 14.8 8.6 2.1 -17.3 -16.4 25.9 1.7 0.1 -2.7 2.9 13.0 -14.5 -12.1 
τ=0.9 6.3 7.5 12.5 7.4 -5.8 -9.5 13.6 -11.4 5.7 -7.3 -0.5 10.0 -5.2 -9.9 
               
bandwidth 0.5 
              
τ=0.1 -3.3 7.3 -5.6 -4.7 -2.0 0.6 -1.3 -2.0 -0.4 -6.8 -0.1 -5.2 0.0 -0.3 
τ=0.2 -1.8 10.1 -5.3 -0.3 -4.1 1.7 -3.7 -9.7 -3.3 -10.4 0.5 1.6 0.0 -0.3 
τ=0.3 0.1 8.4 -8.3 -3.4 -3.2 0.5 -3.0 -10.4 -3.5 -9.1 -0.7 4.5 -0.7 -0.3 
τ=0.4 -2.6 8.2 -8.6 -2.2 -3.4 -7.9 0.4 -2.3 -4.2 -9.1 2.7 6.3 -0.7 -3.0 
τ=0.5 -0.5 8.2 -6.1 -6.6 -5.5 -17.4 0.9 0.7 -2.7 -6.9 9.4 2.1 -6.0 -8.1 
τ=0.6 1.4 5.5 -3.0 -3.9 -26.6 -28.6 9.2 5.7 -2.2 1.5 6.5 2.0 -11.2 -9.9 
τ=0.7 3.1 10.2 0.1 -0.6 -27.3 -26.2 28.0 10.3 0.3 2.4 3.3 9.7 -8.1 -12.4 
τ=0.8 7.5 14.4 8.7 1.6 -21.7 -22.6 28.6 6.6 0.0 -1.3 0.3 12.7 -9.0 -15.1 
τ=0.9 6.0 5.8 14.3 5.1 -8.1 -12.8 14.4 -3.8 7.8 -4.2 -2.9 7.1 -5.7 -13.1 
               
bandwidth cv               
τ=0.1  -3.2   7.4  -3.2 -3.6 -5.5 -0.1 -3.3 0.1 -0.1 -5.0 0.6 0.4 -1.6 -0.3 
τ=0.2  -0.4   11.2  -5.0 -0.3 -3.0 -0.1 -6.4 -11.3 -2.9 -7.5 0.6 -0.7 -5.7 -4.5 
τ=0.3  0.2   9.7  -6.0 -3.7 -5.1 -0.3 -8.7 -4.4 -2.6 -9.6 -5.7 2.3 -3.0 -5.0 
τ=0.4  -2.5   8.0  -6.4 -2.0 0.5 4.4 -1.5 -2.2 0.2 -7.8 -2.4 -0.2 -6.1 -4.3 
τ=0.5  -0.6   7.9  -6.0 -6.6 2.8 1.8 6.0 0.6 0.2 0.5 7.8 -3.4 -5.0 -2.2 
τ=0.6  1.9   4.9  -0.8 -3.8 -5.1 -3.1 6.1 5.3 2.4 1.2 6.1 -10.3 -11.3 -6.8 
τ=0.7  4.7   6.8  0.4 -0.8 -15.4 -8.7 7.7 2.2 -2.4 0.0 0.9 2.7 -10.8 -12.1 
τ=0.8  8.1   12.8  6.5 1.9 -11.2 -11.7 5.3 2.0 -2.4 -0.4 0.0 5.2 -11.0 -12.5 
τ=0.9  6.3   5.4  14.1 1.8 -3.8 -10.0 23.3 0.0 -3.8 -9.5 -0.7 6.4 -11.5 -17.5 
               
Note: Percentage points treatment effects, significant at 10% are marked in italics, significant at 5% are marked in bold, significant at 
1% are marked in bold underlined. 
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Figure C1: Potential outcomes for Mali 2nd grade (Xset 2) 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure C2: Potential outcomes for Mali 5th grade (Xset 2) 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure C3: Potential outcomes for Niger 2nd grade (Xset 2) 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure C4: Potential outcomes for Niger 5th grade (Xset 2) 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure C5: Potential outcomes for Togo 2nd grade (Xset 2) 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure C6: Potential outcomes for Togo 5th grade (Xset 2) 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure C7: Potential outcomes for Mali 2nd grade (Xset 3) 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure C8: Potential outcomes for Mali 5th grade (Xset 3) 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
.  
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure C9: Potential outcomes for Niger 2nd grade (Xset 3) 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure C10: Potential outcomes for Niger 5th grade (Xset 3) 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure C11: Potential outcomes for Niger 5th grade (Xset 3a) 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure C12: Potential outcomes for Togo 2nd grade (Xset 3) 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure C13: Potential outcomes for Togo 5th grade (Xset 3) 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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 Appendix D: Robustness to the sample definition based on job experience 
 
The following graphs show the estimated potential distribution functions for Niger when the sample is 
restricted to include only teacher with at most 4 years of job experience. The results are very similar to those of 
the earlier analysis. 
 
Figure D1: Potential outcomes for Niger 2nd grade (Xset 1) 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5,0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
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Figure D2: Potential outcomes for Niger 5th grade (Xset 1) 
1 2( , , ) (0.5,0.5, 0.25)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
1 2( , , ) (1,1,0.5)Bandwidths h h λ =  
 
 
Bandwidths chosen by cross validation  
 
 
 
Note: Distribution functions of potential outcomes, solid line 1ˆYF , dashed line 0ˆYF . (Horizontal distance is quantile treatment effect.) 
 
